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DEVIANCE, RISK, AND LAW:
REFLECTIONS ON THE DEMAND FOR THE
PREVENTIVE DETENTION OF SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS
JOSEPH MARGULIES *
Cognitive psychologists have long understood the tendency of people
to make sense of what is new by analogy to what is old. They call this
“analogical reasoning.” 1 I prefer the more familiar and less clunky
phrase, “reasoning by analogy,” but the meaning is the same. Reasoning
by analogy “allows us to apply knowledge we have from one domain to a
new context and therefore to make inferences and judgments without
starting from scratch.” 2 In addition, by framing our understanding of the
novel in terms of the familiar, we conjure up images of a proper solution to
new problems. “When our understanding of the source domain includes
normative prescriptions and evaluations, [they] are applied analogically to
suggest the right evaluation or course of action in the new situation.”3 This

*
Clinical Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. In the interest of
disclosing possible biases, I was counsel of record for the petitioners in Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004), involving post-9/11 detentions of foreign nationals at Guantanamo, and
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), involving post-9/11 detentions of U.S. citizens in Iraq.
Presently, I am counsel of record for Abu Zubaydah, for whose interrogation the infamous
“torture memos” were written. These were legal memos written by attorneys with the Office
of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice which wrongly concluded that torture, when
ordered by the President in his capacity as Commander in Chief, would not violate domestic
or international law. Zubaydah is often described as a candidate for preventive detention.
An earlier version of this Article was presented at a symposium at Seton Hall University
Law School. I am grateful to the participants for their helpful comments and to Sidney
Tarrow, Albert Alschuler, Jonathan Simon, and Michael Sherry for their many suggestions.
Thanks also to Sarah Grady and Zachary Dillon for their research assistance.
1
See, e.g., NICHOLAS J. G. WINTER, DANGEROUS FRAMES: HOW IDEAS ABOUT RACE &
GENDER SHAPE PUBLIC OPINION 4 (2008). Analogical reasoning is much discussed as a
mode of judicial decisionmaking. See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, A Defense of Analogical
Reasoning in Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1179 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical
Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993).
2
See WINTER, supra note 1, at 4.
3
Id. at 4–5.
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Article applies these insights to the present debate over preventive
detention of alleged terrorists.
I. INTRODUCTION
The post-9/11 world has produced a call for the preventive detention of
suspected terrorists, by which I mean a system of indefinite detention based
solely on predictions of future dangerousness without regard to past
conduct. 4 Legal academics and journalists have spilled considerable ink
exploring this topic, but almost no attempt has been made to place the call
in its larger cultural context. 5 This is regrettable since it amounts to reading
only the last chapter of a long book then grumbling that events seem to
have come upon us with so little explanation.6

4
See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, BROOKINGS INST., LONG-TERM TERRORIST DETENTION AND
OUR NATIONAL SECURITY COURT (2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0209_detention_goldsmith/0209_detention_goldsmith.pdf;
Stephanie Cooper Blum, The Why and How of Preventive Detention in the War on Terror,
26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 51 (2009); David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention,
Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (2009); Stella Burch Elias, Rethinking
“Preventive Detention” from a Comparative Perspective: Three Frameworks for Detaining
Terrorist Suspects, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 99 (2009); Lindsey Graham & John
McCain, How to Handle the Guantanamo Detainees, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2009, at A15,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124157680630090517.html; Glenn Greenwald,
Victory on Preventive Detention Law: In Context, SALON (Sept. 24, 2009),
http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2009/09/24/detention;
Joanne
Mariner, Criminal Justice Techniques Are Adequate to the Problem of Terrorism, BOSTON
REV. (Dec. 10, 2008), http://bostonreview.net/BR34.1/mariner.php. For a discussion of
preventive detention pre-9/11, see Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: The Limits of the Preventive
State, 88 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771 (1998) (noting the increased call for a preventive
state pre-9/11 and exploring its constitutional limits).
5
Most legal academics have been slow to examine post-9/11 policies in light of modern
developments in criminology, just as they have been slow to give up the enormously popular
myth that wartime repressions in this country are different in quality and kind from an
imagined peacetime norm. For a critique of post-9/11 legal scholarship in this regard, see
Joseph Margulies & Hope Metcalf, Terrorizing Academia, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433 (2011).
For legal scholarship that recognizes the cultural and legal link between the so-called Wars
on Terror and Crime, see, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Choosing Our Wars, Transforming
Governance: Cancer, Crime, and Terror, in RISK AND THE WAR ON TERROR 79 (Louise
Amoore & Marieke de Goede eds., 2008); James Forman Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the
War on Crime Has Made the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
331 (2009); Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 579 (2010).
6
This inquiry is part of a larger project that examines the changes in American thought
produced by the attacks of 9/11. See JOSEPH MARGULIES, LIKE A SINGLE MIND: SEPTEMBER
11 AND THE ARC OF AMERICAN THOUGHT (forthcoming 2013). It is also part of an effort to
place post-9/11 legal developments in their broader cultural and political context and thereby
diminish the narrow focus on law as an explanatory variable. For an extended discussion of
this objective, see Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 5.

2011]

DEVIANCE, RISK, AND LAW

731

The loud clamor for preventive detention stands at the convergence of
three powerful developments in contemporary American culture. The first
is what my colleague, the historian Michael Sherry, calls “the punitive turn
in American life,” which refers to the angry impulse over the past several
decades to purge the community of undesirable elements by dramatically
increasing the government’s power to monitor, exclude, restrain, and
imprison those considered a threat. 7 The second is a dangerous refinement
of the concept of “security,” which has merged the cultural demand for the
elimination of risk with the impassioned rhetoric of war. 8 And the third
development is a parallel turn in the law of criminal procedure. Over the
past several decades, “[t]he call for protection from the state has been
increasingly displaced by the demand for protection by the state.” 9
Criminal procedure has steadily accommodated this demand, endorsing
what the sociologist David Garland has branded “the criminology of the
dangerous other.” 10
Taken together, these developments have given rise to a distinct habit
of the American mind, a characteristic way of understanding and
responding to perceived deviance and risk. In contemporary American
thought, a certain type of event triggers a corresponding collection of
mental images and sets in motion increasingly familiar solutions, all of
which Americans describe with a predictable set of tropes. Much of
American society now gazes upon deviant behavior, sees only risk, and
recognizes only one response, which it has summoned—and intensified—to
meet the insatiable demands for security in a post-9/11 world. 11
7

Michael Sherry, Dead or Alive: American Vengeance Goes Global, 31 REV. INT’L
STUD. 245, 258 (2005); MICHAEL SHERRY, GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE PUNITIVE TURN IN
AMERICAN LIFE (forthcoming 2013); see infra notes 14–75.
8
See infra notes 149–203.
9
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 12 (2001).
10
Id. at 184; see infra notes 76–88. Naturally, these developments have encouraged and
reinforced each other. A willingness to purge undesirables from the community makes it
easier to imagine and attempt to create a world without risk. Zero tolerance for risk
encourages judges and legislators to accept substantive claims that would have once been
considered unimaginable. And a determination to conceive the rule of law as a system
designed to protect society from the depravity of a subhuman predator makes draconian
measures seem less foreign to American sensibilities. In the familiar way that cause
becomes effect and effect becomes another cause, it is impossible to separate one
development from another, but it is easy enough to see that related forces are at work and
that they combine to produce the final condition.
11
There is certainly nothing unusual in this. It is precisely what Bernard Bailyn had in
mind when he described the very different set of ideas captured in the title of his most
famous work:
[I]n the intense political heat of the decade after 1763, . . . ideas about the world and America’s
place in it were fused into a comprehensive view, unique in its moral and intellectual appeal. It
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In this way, the cultural demand for preventive detention of alleged
terrorists has slid into the familiar and preexisting frames about risk and
deviance. Because Americans know only one reaction to the problems of
deviance and risk, they have enlisted them in response to the post-9/11
iteration. A belief that terrorism always reflects the act of an inherently
malevolent disposition, for which no further explanation is possible or
necessary, swims in the same stream as a similar view of serial sex
offenders, juvenile super-predators, and other dangerous criminals. The
conviction that American foreign policy cannot be blamed for terrorism and
that it is heresy to suggest otherwise is merely an amplification of the belief
that society cannot be blamed for criminal conduct. The mistrust of the
criminal justice system, and particularly the certainty that the courts are too
lenient and that “justice” is hamstrung by elaborate technicalities spun by
liberal courts, elides easily into the belief that the courts cannot be trusted to
preside over terrorism trials. And the view that any margin of error is too
great when dealing with apocalyptic threats naturally produces a system
constructed so that it cannot be allowed to fail. 12
At the same time, the call for preventive detention is not simply the
application of existing penological thought to the latest constructed crime
wave. Terrorists (at least Islamic terrorists) are imagined as vastly more
dangerous than any mere criminal and therefore wholly unsuited to the
prosaic and quotidian machinery of the criminal justice system, a condition
confirmed by the overheated rhetoric of war. In the popular imagination,
war has always magnified threats and justified repression. Whatever
stomach society may have for peacetime risk diminishes dramatically
is the development of this view to the point of overwhelming persuasiveness to the majority of
American leaders and the meaning this view gave to the events of the time . . . that explains the
origins of the American Revolution. For this peculiar configuration of ideas constituted in effect
an intellectual switchboard wired so that certain combinations of events would activate a distinct
set of signals—danger signals, indicating hidden impulses and the likely trajectory of events
impelled by them.

BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22–23 (1992).
12
Throughout this piece, I repeatedly suggest that American thought is monolithic and
that there is such a thing as American “society,” the views of which can be readily
ascertained and neatly summarized. This is done only to avoid the repeated use of modifiers
that signal substantial rather than universal agreement with the point being made. The
punitive turn has been broadly accepted by a bipartisan segment of the American population
and has given rise to what sociologists and political scientists call “a hegemonic discourse.”
See, e.g., David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 610 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 22, 23 (2007) (“Neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode
of discourse and has pervasive effects on ways of thought and political-economic practices
to the point where it has become incorporated into the commonsense way we interpret, live
in, and understand the world.”). Naturally, this discourse is not universal, and a significant
alternative can be heard, particularly in academia. But my concern is with the dominant
narrative, and the reader will forgive me if I seem to treat it as the only one.

2011]

DEVIANCE, RISK, AND LAW

733

during war when any willingness to accept risk is attacked as dangerously
foolhardy. The cultural response to 9/11 in general, and the call for
preventive detention in particular, has thus intensified and sharpened the
frames of risk and deviance that were borrowed from modern
criminology. 13
II. THE PUNITIVE TURN IN AMERICAN LIFE
The numbers are still sobering, notwithstanding their depressing
familiarity. Approximately 2,300,000 people are in prison or jail—at least
as of yearend 2009—more than every man, woman, and child in Detroit,
San Francisco, and St. Paul combined. 14 It is both the largest prison
population and the highest incarceration rate in the world,15 and has been
accommodated by an astounding growth in prison capacity: from 1985 to
2000, on average, a new state or federal prison opened in the United States
every week. 16 As of 2008, more than 41,000 men and women in the United

13

This also explains why the official response to 9/11, which so vehemently resists
invocation of the criminal model, would nonetheless draw so heavily on modern
criminological thought. Quite simply, this is how American society has learned to deal with
problems of deviance and risk, regardless of whether the response is denominated crimecontrol or warfare. It is now what comes most naturally. For a similar, and eerily prescient,
discussion of the use of the new penological tools and rhetoric in the setting of a war on
terror, see Malcolm Feeley & Jonathan Simon, Actuarial Justice: the Emerging New
Criminal Law, in THE FUTURES OF CRIMINOLOGY 193–96 (David Nelken ed., 1994)
(comparing Israel’s response to the first intifada with America’s response to the growing
“urban underclass”).
14
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2009, at 7 app. tbl.2 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/cpus09.pdf [hereinafter CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS, 2009]. With respect to the total
prison population, there is at least some reason to hope. The total number of people
incarcerated in 2009 fell by approximately 48,000, which was the first annual decline since
the Bureau of Justice Statistics began reporting the data in 1980. Id. at tbl.1. The
incarceration rate has declined steadily since the early 1980s. Id. Joseph Kennedy used this
same rhetorical devise more than ten years ago, pointing out that “we have more people
under criminal justice supervision than we have living in Indiana, Washington, Missouri,
Tennessee, Wisconsin, Maryland, or any one of thirty other states and that we currently have
enough jail and prison capacity to incarcerate every woman, man, and child in Manhattan
with room to spare.” Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity
Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 832 (2000). Since then, the numbers
have grown considerably.
15
ROY WALMSLEY, KING’S COLL. LONDON, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD
PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 (8th ed. 2009), available at http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/
law/research/icps/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf. Though the United States clearly has the
highest incarceration rate in the world, the total number of prisoners in China may be
modestly higher than in the United States, depending on the number of people held by the
Chinese government in “administrative detention.” Id. at 3 tbl.2, 4 tbl.3.
16
MARC MAUER, SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO INCARCERATE 1–2 (2d ed. 2006).

734

JOSEPH MARGULIES

[Vol. 101

States were serving life sentences without the possibility of parole.17
Another five million are on probation or parole—again, far more than any
country in the world. 18 And the racial impact of these numbers is even
more dispiriting. African Americans are eight times more likely to be
incarcerated than whites. As of 2004, over twelve percent of AfricanAmerican males between the ages of twenty-five and twenty-nine were in
custody. 19 And for under-educated young black men, the incarceration
rates are astounding: in 2000, nearly one in five African-American men
under the age of forty-one who had not attended college was in prison or
jail. 20 The extent to which incarceration has become part of the normal life
experience for African-American men is simply staggering. As Bruce
Western recently observed,
The criminal justice system has become so pervasive that we should count prisons and
jails among the key institutions that shape the life course of recent birth cohorts of
African American men. By the end of the 1990s, black men with little schooling were
more likely to be in prison or jail than to be in a labor union or enrolled in a
government welfare or training program. Black men born in the late 1960s were more
likely, by 1999, to have served time in state or federal prison than to have obtained a
four-year degree or served in the military. For non-college black men, a prison record
21
had become twice as common as military service.

The punitive turn has produced not only a great many more prisoners
and prisons. It has also generated a fondness—in fact, an enthusiasm—for
harsh conditions of confinement that was unthinkable only a few decades
ago. Though prisons as a whole have become stunningly cruel places, this
trend is perhaps best illustrated by the dramatic growth in supermax
facilities. In 1984, only one prison in the United States fit the description of
a supermax—the federal prison at Marion, Illinois, after the lockdown
imposed in 1983. 22 Twenty years later, there were supermax prisons in
forty-four states holding approximately 25,000 inmates. 23 The Federal
17

Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Parole
Sentences in the United States, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 27, 27 (2010).
18
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS, 2009, supra note 14, at 2 tbl.1.
19
BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 3 (2006).
20
Id. at 3, 16–17.
21
Id. at 31.
22
See Leena Kurki and Norval Morris, The Purposes, Practices, and Problems of
Supermax Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 385, 385 (2001).
23
Lance Tapley, The Worst of the Worst: Supermax Torture in America, BOSTON REV.,
Nov./Dec. 2010, at 30. Counting the number of prisoners in supermax is often complicated
by a lack of consensus on what constitutes a supermax facility. In Mears’s research, 95% of
supermax wardens agreed on the following definition: “A supermax is defined as a standalone unit or part of another facility and is designated for violent or disruptive inmates. It
typically involves up to 23-hours per day, single-cell confinement for an indefinite period of
time. Inmates in supermax housing have minimal contact with staff and other inmates.”

2011]

DEVIANCE, RISK, AND LAW

735

Bureau of Prisons also operates a supermax at Florence, Colorado, which
houses another 11,000 inmates, including a number who have been
convicted of terrorist-related offenses. 24
Conditions at supermax prisons vary modestly from state to state and
from states to the federal facility, but in general they are characterized by
strict isolation and rigorously enforced, unrelenting control.25 Supermax
prisons have abandoned even the pretense that they are meant to rehabilitate
or reform. The facility typically provides little or no programming,
education, or counseling—nothing more than the barest constitutional
minima. 26 Prisoners, who are routinely described as “the worst of the
worst,” 27 spend nearly every minute of every day confined in a small cell
made of concrete and steel. Norval Morris once described the cells at
Tamms, the Illinois supermax, where conditions are representative:
Your cell measures ten feet by twelve feet. It is made of poured concrete with a steel
door—no bars—just a lot of little holes, smaller than the tip of your finger, punched
through it. You have a stainless steel toilet and sink built as a unit that would not be
easy to destroy. There is a small window, high and narrow, that lets in a little outside
light. There is a mirror made of polished metal, again tending to be indestructible.
Your bunk or bed, or whatever you may call it, is also of poured concrete, an integral
part of the cell, but you have a slim plastic foam mattress to put on it. There is a wellprotected fluorescent light and a light switch. At night . . . , the light cannot be turned
off entirely; it unrestrainedly gives out a dim light, bright enough for the guards to
peer in at you. There is a small trapdoor, low down on the steel door to your cell,
28
through which your food can be pushed to you.

Daniel P. Mears, A Critical Look at Supermax Prisons, 30 CORR. COMPENDIUM 6, 49 n.3
(2005).
24
Tapley, supra note 23, at 30.
25
For a discussion of the minor variations in conditions at supermax prisons, see Kurki
& Morris, supra note 22, at 394–410. See also, e.g., Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855
(S.D. Tex. 1999) (describing supermax in Texas); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (describing conditions at Pelican Bay, in California); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, COLD STORAGE: SUPER-MAXIMUM SECURITY CONFINEMENT IN INDIANA (1997);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RED ONION STATE PRISON: SUPER-MAXIMUM SECURITY
CONFINEMENT IN VIRGINIA (1999).
26
Kurki & Morris, supra note 22, at 407.
27
See, e.g., Laura LaFay, 7 New Prisons Will Handle Growing Inmate Count,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Aug. 23, 1997, at A1 (“Red Onion, which will house 1,267 prisoners and
employ about 400 people, has been designed for what Corrections Director Ron Angelone
likes to call ‘the worst of the worst.’ ‘These are hardcore, violent, predatory individuals who
are a risk to other individuals and to staff,’ he said.”); Cathy Frye, ‘Super Max’ Slated to
House ‘Worst of Worst,’ ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Dec. 17, 1999, at 1A; Karen Grigsby
Bates, Moussaoui’s New Home: A Cell in Super Max Prison, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 4,
2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5382725 (stating that the
federal supermax at Florence “is designed to isolate what’s often described as the worst of
the worst of the prison population”).
28
Kurki & Morris, supra note 22, at 395.
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Within this space, prisoners are deliberately confined so they cannot
see or touch another human being. At Tamms, and only with great
difficulty, they can communicate with other inmates by shouting through
tiny spaces where the food trap meets imperfectly with the remainder of the
steel door—an opportunity considered a design defect at Tamms and since
remedied at other supermax prisons.29 Prisoners average more than twentythree hours a day in solitary confinement. They are allowed out of their
cells a few hours a week for exercise—anywhere from one to five,
depending on their disciplinary status—and never more than an hour a
day. 30 They cannot leave their cells unless they are first heavily shackled
and manacled, and only when escorted by several guards wearing riot gear
and armor. Exercise, like everything in their lives, is an entirely solitary
affair. At Tamms, they are brought to a concrete cage somewhat larger than
their cell, “with a small grating high in the corner of the roof through which
you can see the sky.” There is no exercise equipment, “but some prisoners
are now allowed to have tough rubber handballs to throw against the walls
of the yard.” 31
Meanwhile, outside the prison walls, mass incarceration has been
complemented by an elaborate system of social controls targeted at the
populations considered mostly likely to place the rest of society at risk.
Most felons lose their right to vote, in some cases for life, which makes
them irrelevant to the electoral process.32 In addition, the modern penal
system frequently also restricts their right to serve on a jury, 33 to live within

29

Id. at 398.
Id. at 395–96.
31
Id. at 395.
32
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FEDERAL STATUTES
IMPOSING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES UPON CONVICTION 1 (2003), available at
http://www.justice.gov/pardon/collateral_consequences.pdf [hereinafter OPA FEDERAL
SUMMARY] (“The great majority of states impose some type of restriction on the ability of
convicted felons to vote.”); Marc Mauer, Mass Imprisonment and the Disappearing Voters,
in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 50, 51
(Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (“Forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia do not permit prison inmates to vote; thirty-two states disenfranchise felons on
parole; and twenty-eight disenfranchise felons on probation. In addition, in thirteen states a
felony conviction can result in disenfranchisement, generally for life, even after an offender
has completed his or her sentence.”).
33
OPA FEDERAL SUMMARY, supra note 32, at 2–3 (stating that a conviction in federal or
state court of any crime punishable by more than one year prohibits an individual from
serving on a federal grand or petit jury, absent a pardon); Christopher Uggen, Jeff Manza &
Melissa Thompson, Citizenship, Democracy, and the Civic Reintegration of Criminal
Offenders, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 281, 297 (2006) (finding forty-seven
states restrict an individual’s right to serve on a jury after a felony conviction).
30
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designated locations or in public housing, 34 to travel or assemble within
certain portions of a community, 35 to participate in most social welfare
programs, 36 to receive college or small business loans, 37 and to work in
various professions. 38 In the aggregate, the result of these policies is the
near replication of the colonial state of “civil death,” a condition in which a
person is deprived of all political, civil, and legal rights, except those he
may enjoy when he is inevitably prosecuted again. 39 His status as a person
with rights, in other words, operates only in connection with his conjoined
status as an accused or convicted criminal.

34

OPA FEDERAL SUMMARY, supra note 32, at 4 (stating that federal courts “may impose
certain occupational restrictions as a condition of probation or supervised release”); Jeremy
Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT,
at 15, 24 (“The Public Housing Assessment System, established by the federal government,
creates financial incentives for public housing agencies to adopt strict admission and eviction
standards to screen out individuals who engage in criminal behavior.”).
35
For residence restriction of sex offenders, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY
ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE US 100 (2007) (“At least 20 states have enacted laws
that prohibit certain sex offenders from living within a specified distance of schools, daycare
centers, parks, and other places where children congregate . . . . In addition, hundreds of
municipalities (in states with and without residency restriction statutes) have also passed
similar ordinances . . . .”). For restrictions on the right to move freely within a community,
but not targeted at sex offenders alone, see generally KATHERINE BECKETT & STEVE
HERBERT, BANISHED: THE NEW SOCIAL CONTROL IN URBAN AMERICA (2010). For related
restrictions on the right to travel, see Travis, supra note 34, at 24 (“In 1992, Congress passed
a law requiring states to revoke or suspend the drivers’ licenses of people convicted of drug
felonies, or suffer the loss of 10 percent of the state’s federal highway funds.”).
36
Travis, supra note 34, at 23 (noting that after welfare reform law was enacted in 1996,
the federal government required states to “permanently bar individuals with drug-related
felony convictions from receiving federally funded public assistance and food stamps during
their lifetime”). Drug offenders may also be denied federal retirement benefits, Social
Security, disability, and benefits for military service. Additionally, individuals convicted of
drug-related and fraud-related felonies are permanently excluded from any federal health
care program and certain state health care programs. See OPA FEDERAL SUMMARY, supra
note 32, at 8–9.
37
Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 158 (1999); Travis,
supra note 34, at 24 (“The Higher Education Act of 1998 suspends the eligibility for a
student loan or other assistance for someone convicted of a drug-related offense.”).
38
Felons are barred from a number of different professions, including most commonly
employment that requires contact with children, health service positions, and security
services. In some states, however, this prohibition has been extended to positions like
acupuncturist and cosmetologist. Uggen, Manza & Thompson, supra note 33, at 298.
39
See, e.g., id. at 296 (“[F]ormer felons must fulfill the duties of citizenship, but their
conviction status effectively denies their rights to participate in social life.”); Travis, supra
note 34, at 19 (“[T]hese punishments have become instruments of ‘social exclusion;’ they
create a permanent diminution in social status of convicted offenders, a distancing between
‘us’ and ‘them.’”).
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But many judges and communities have taken these steps still further
and have embraced shaming ceremonies. Certain categories of ex-offenders
are publicly identified, obligated to announce themselves to their
community or their victims, or to wear distinctive clothing or brand
themselves by certain activity.
Some municipalities, for example, publish offenders’ names in newspapers or even on
billboards, a disposition that is especially common for men convicted of soliciting
prostitutes. Other jurisdictions broadcast the names of various types of offenders on
community-access television channels. . . . Some judges order petty thieves to wear tshirts announcing their crimes. Others achieve the same effect with brightly colored
bracelets that read “DUI Convict,” “I Write Bad Checks,” and the like. One judge
40
ordered a woman to wear a sign declaring “I am a convicted child molester.”

These penalties seem to be limited only by official imagination. Some
jurisdictions insist that offenders publicly debase themselves. They must
stand in the local courthouse with a sign describing their offense, for
example, or publicize their own convictions in a first-person narrative. 41
“In Maryland, . . . juvenile offenders must apologize on their hands and
knees and are released from confinement only if they persuade their victims
that their remorse is sincere.” 42
****
The profligate cruelty of the criminal justice system is merely a
symptom of the punitive turn in American life and not the condition itself.
Like a fever, it is a sign that the body suffers from a dangerous malady. But
no one should suppose it is the only symptom—the evidence for the
punitive turn courses through nearly all of American society. And one

40

Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 632
(1996) (internal citations omitted). Professor Kahan believes that shaming penalties
represent a “feasible alternative to imprisonment for many offenses.” Id. at 594. For a
contrary view, see James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107
YALE L.J. 1055 (1998). Professor Whitman properly focuses on the harm of shaming
penalties to society, rather than to the offender:
The most compelling arguments against such humiliation sanctions do not, in fact, involve the
way they deal with the offender at all . . . . In the last analysis, we should think of shame
sanctions as wrong because they involve a species of lynch justice, and a peculiarly disturbing
species of lynch justice at that—a species of official lynch justice. The chief evil in public
humiliation sanctions is that they involve an ugly, and politically dangerous, complicity between
the state and the crowd . . . . They represent an unacceptable style of governance through their
play on public psychology.

Id. at 1059. Or, as John McCain would later say in a distinctly post-9/11 context, “It’s not
about who they are. It’s about who we are.” 151 CONG. REC. S8792 (2005) (debate over
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2005_cr/s072505.html.
41
Kahan, supra note 40, at 633.
42
Id. at 634.
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place it is particularly apparent is in popular culture. At mid-century,
deviance was consistently portrayed as the product of social conditions
beyond the individual’s control.43 The highest social value was strict
adherence to the rule of law, regardless of the outcome in a particular
case, 44 and the purpose of the criminal justice system was to realign the
offender with society. 45 Today, by contrast, deviance is depicted as the
result of innate evil for which society bears no responsibility but suffers all
the consequences, and which the criminal law naïvely protects.46
The movies 12 Angry Men, 47 released in 1957, and To Kill a
Mockingbird, 48 released in 1962, for instance, signaled a reverence for the
law rather than a cheap attachment to a particular outcome. 49 Atticus Finch,
the hero of To Kill a Mockingbird, “evokes the heroic imagery of both
individuals dedicated to the law and law itself as an heroic institution
restraining the baser human instincts.” 50 The movie conceives the law as a
protection against a mob mentality and as superior to the desires and fears
of individuals. 51 In the same way, 12 Angry Men brings the American into
the jury room and reveals the institution’s “great practical and symbolic
importance in the American system of justice.”52 Consistently, the media

43
Nicole Rafter, American Criminal Trial Films: An Overview of Their Development,
1930–2000, 28 J.L. & SOC’Y 9, 15 (2001) (depicting film in the 1950s through the 1960s as a
demonstration of America’s reverence for the law). “[T]he classic courtroom movies present
them as professional wizards and guardians of the country’s sacred traditions.” Id.
44
TIMOTHY O. LENZ, CHANGING IMAGES OF LAW IN FILM & TELEVISION CRIME STORIES
45–76 (2003).
45
E.g., James D. Unnever & Francis T. Cullen, The Social Sources of Americans’
Punitiveness: A Test of Three Competing Models, 48 AM. SOC’Y CRIMINOLOGY 99, 102
(2010) (“[I]n the 1960s, the public was more willing to confront crime with a two-prong
approach: reduce the root causes of crime, such as poverty and unemployment, while
providing offenders the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves. The lack of support for the
death penalty is evidence of this less punitive approach toward crime.”).
46
Francis T. Cullen et. al., Public Opinion about Punishment and Corrections, 27 CRIME
& JUST. 1, 2 (2000) (“‘Get tough’ thinking and policies have replaced calls for more
humanistic correctional practices, and their dominance appears unassailable.”).
47
12 ANGRY MEN (United Artists 1957).
48
TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal Pictures 1962).
49
LENZ, supra note 44.
50
Id. at 46; see also Maureen E. Markey, Natural Law, Positive Law, and Conflicting
Social Norms in Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird, 32 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 162, 190 (2010)
(“Atticus shows great respect, even reverence, for the rule of law, the established legal code
of this country as reflected in the Constitution.”).
51
Markey, supra note 50, at 191 (“His calm and steady rationalism and his absolute
belief in his moral position enable him to calmly face down, with nothing more than a
newspaper in his hand, a lynch mob who come to abduct his client.”).
52
LENZ, supra note 44, at 45.
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separated sin from sinner. The 1939 film, They Made Me a Criminal, 53 for
example, emphasized that criminals are a product of their environment. 54
And the 1937 film Dead End 55 and 1938 film Angels with Dirty Faces 56
gave humanizing portrayals of criminals in order to separate judgments of
the person from the condemnation of the crime. 57
Beginning in the late 1960s, however, media portrayals began to
change. 58 The relationship between the accused and society became
oppositional. Instead of a desire to understand the criminal and help
rehabilitate him, society began to view him as a plague that needed to be
controlled. Clint Eastwood’s Dirty Harry 59 in 1971 is prototypical. In the
film, the law becomes a partner in crime. “The injustice is obvious: the law
prevents a crazed killer from being convicted of anything.” 60 Clint
Eastwood throws away his badge and takes it upon himself to see that
justice is done. The message is unmistakable: if the law gets in the way, we
should throw it out.
This transformation—from law as the object of reverence in films like
To Kill a Mockingbird to law as a hypertechnical obstacle to justice in films
like Dirty Harry—is now essentially complete. Rare is the film or
television series that presents law as anything other than an obstacle to the
punitive impulse in American life. 61 Representative in this vein is the
contemporary Showtime series, Dexter, which features the serial killer as an
unlikely protagonist. The show’s hero, Dexter Morgan, works in a police

53

THEY MADE ME A CRIMINAL (Warner Bros. Pictures 1939).
LENZ, supra note 44, at 47 (“The title of They Made Me a Criminal (1939) actually
describes one of the tenants of the liberal theory of criminology, the belief that criminals are
made, not born, that crime is caused by nurture not nature.”).
55
DEAD END (Samuel Goldwyn Co. 1937).
56
ANGELS WITH DIRTY FACES (Warner Bros. Pictures 1938).
57
LENZ, supra note 44, at 48 (“The liberal message of this film is that individuals are
basically good and that institutions . . . have a very important role to play in ensuring that
individuals become productive, law-abiding citizens.”).
58
Joseph R. Dominick, Crime and Law Enforcement on Prime-Time Television, 37 PUB.
OPINION Q. 241, 241 (1973) (“During the unrest of the late 1960s . . . [p]opular reaction
ranged from an increased demand for law and order to a diminished respect for law
enforcement, especially among young people.”). By the 1990s, the transformation was all
but complete. See Rafter, supra note 43, at 20 (“Reflecting actual criminal trials (such as
those involving O.J. Simpson and the assailants of Rodney King), in which justice seemed to
many to have gone astray, courtroom films of the nineties mistrusted the criminal justice
system’s ability to accomplish its mission.”).
59
DIRTY HARRY (Warner Bros. Pictures 1971).
60
LENZ, supra note 44, at 111.
61
Rafter, supra note 43, at 20 (2001) (“Many began with the assumption that the system
was broken beyond repair.”).
54
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station as a blood spatter analyst by day, but as a serial killer by night.62 He
sees first-hand the repeated failures of the criminal justice system and
actively works to keep his “targets” off the law enforcement radar so that
the law does not interfere with his heroic brand of vigilante justice.63 When
the community finally discovers that a serial killer is killing only murderers,
it dubs him the “dark avenger” and creates a comic book series and action
figure after him. 64
Interestingly, Dexter never kills without first taking meticulous steps
to ensure his target’s guilt. The criminals look normal, as though they were
one of us. It is possible to be mistaken, therefore, and a liberal society
cannot tolerate the cold-blooded murder of an innocent person. Before an
audience will accept that justice must be done, Dexter must convince them
of the target’s guilt. So, under the watchful eye of the television audience,
he checks records and compares fingerprints. Once the audience has been
dutifully reassured, Dexter may dispatch the victim with the vigilante
justice that has come to define contemporary culture. In that way, the show
introduces the dilemma of the monster hidden in our midst, and suggests
that law enforcement, if unfettered by the law, can solve the problem
accurately and quickly.
More recently, another series presents a different solution to a similar
problem. In The Event, an alien race has reached the United States with an
unknown and therefore potentially dangerous agenda. Unfortunately for us,
they look and act exactly as we do, except that they do not age. The
government is keeping a small number of them captive, without criminal
charges, until they may uncover the remainder.65 One of the major figures
in the show is an unscrupulous lawyer who spouts the rhetoric of rights and
the rule of law. But she in fact is an alien who plans a revolution against
the United States. The symbolism is obvious. “They” are aliens who,
though they look like us, are fundamentally different and intend our
destruction. To be safe, we must detain them indefinitely, without charges,
while we take the steps necessary to protect the community. But they have
hijacked the law, and have begun to use our rights to destroy us. We must

62

Dexter (Showtime television broadcast); see Watch Dexter on Showtime: America’s
Favorite Serial Killer, http://www.sho.com/site/dexter/about.do (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
63
Id. (“When he’s not helping the homicide division solve murders, he satisfies his dark
desires by hunting and killing bad guys who slip through the justice system.”).
64
Dexter, Episode Guide: Season 2 Episode 5: The Dark Defender,
http://www.sho.com/site/dexter/episodes.do?seriesid=323&seasonid=2&episodeid=130352
(last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
65
The Event: I Haven’t Told You Everything (NBC television broadcast Sept. 20, 2010).
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be vigilant and recognize that the law was meant for us and not for them. 66
It is the modern morality tale for preventive detention.
And then, of course, there is the much-commented upon FOX
Television series 24, where Jack Bauer tortured a new prisoner every week,
always to brilliant effect. During its seven-year run, 24 was wildly popular.
Websites now call for Jack Bauer as president, 67 even though in the course
of a single season (that is, a single cinematic day), Bauer tortured his
brother, shot his boss, and executed a prisoner so he could retrieve a piece
of information the prisoner had swallowed. A number of observers have
asked how or whether 24, with its relentless normalization of torture, may
have affected American culture.68 The conservative Heritage Foundation,
for instance, hosted an event in June 2006 entitled, “24 and America’s
Image in Fighting Terrorism: Fact, Fiction, or Does it Matter?” Rush
Limbaugh moderated and Michael Chertoff, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, appeared as one of the panelists. 69 Though the change may not be
attributable to 24 alone, it is certainly the case that 9/11 marked a turning
point in the cultural portrayal of torture. Even in the most punitive
moments of the last quarter of the twentieth century, torture was invariably
presented in popular culture as a tool used by the demonic other against the
(usually) American hero. After 9/11, however, torture became part of the
American hero’s arsenal. Before, the cultural message was that America
would prevail despite torture. Today, by contrast, the message is that
America would prevail because of torture. 70
****
66

See The Event: To Keep Us Safe (NBC television broadcast Sept. 27, 2010).
For example, in Janauary 2010, a Facebook page entitled “Jack Bauer for President”
was created, inviting “everyone who thinks we would be better off if Jack Bauer were
President of the United States” to join. FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/JackBauer-For-President/268683864258?sk=info (last visited Apr. 5, 2011); see also JACK
BAUER FOR PRESIDENT: TERRORISM AND POLITICS IN 24 (Richard Miniter ed., 2008).
68
See, e.g., Dennis Broe, Fox and Its Friends: Global Commodification and the New
Cold War, 43 CINEMA J. 97 (2004); Steven Keslowitz, The Simpsons, 24 and the Law: How
Homer Simpson and Jack Bauer Influence Congressional Lawmaking and Judicial
Reasoning, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2787 (2008).
69
See 24 and America’s Image in Fighting Terrorism: Fact, Fiction, or Does it Matter?
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (June 23, 2006), http://www.heritage.org/events/2006/06/
24-and-americas-image-in-fighting-terrorism-fact-fiction-or-does-it-matter.
70
“From 2002 through 2005, the Parents Television Council counted 624 torture scenes
in prime time, a six-fold increase. UCLA’s Television Violence Monitoring Project reports
‘torture on TV shows is significantly higher than it was five years ago and the characters
who torture have changed. It used to be that only villains on television tortured. Today,
“good guy” and heroic American characters torture—and this torture is depicted as
necessary, effective and even patriotic.’” Maura Moynihan, Torture Chic: Why Is the Media
Glorifying
Inhumane,
Sadistic
Behavior?,
ALTERNET
(Feb.
3,
2009),
http://www.alternet.org/story/424739.
67
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Scholars have advanced an impressive set of explanations for the
punitive turn in the United States. Political, sociological, racial, and
economic imperatives have all figured in the literature.71 The answer is
undoubtedly complex; no major shift in American culture could possibly
owe its genesis to a single factor. Some explanations are more compelling
than others. Conservative writers, for instance, have suggested that
dramatically harsher sentences can be traced to legitimate public outcry
over a sharp increase in crime. 72 But the data do not bear this out. As
Katherine Beckett has shown, public concern about crime and safety came
after elites began to press it as an issue; in some instances only after crime
rates had begun to decline. This suggests the “crisis” was, like most social
crises, constructed. 73 But legitimate debates over causes should not obscure

71

See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 8 (2007) (“[M]ass
incarceration is an inevitable effect of reshaping political authority around crime.”); Sherry,
supra note 7, at 249–54 (canvassing various explanations but maintaining that “the core of
the urge to imprison was fear of a newly jobless marauding underclass . . . .”); Jonathan
Simon, Sanctioning Government: Explaining America’s Severity Revolution, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 217, 221 (2001) (discussing explanations “rooted in three distinct theoretical traditions
in contemporary sociology: Political Economy, Cultural Interpretation, and Governmental
Rationalities”); Unnever & Cullen, supra note 45, at 101, 119 (examining three explanations
for the punitive turn, “the escalating crime-distrust model, the moral decline model, and the
racial-animus model,” and concluding that “one of the most salient and consistent predictors
of American punitiveness is racial animus”).
72
KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS 55–61 (1997).
73
Id. at 56–57; see also Stuart A. Scheingold, Constructing the New Political
Criminology: Power, Authority, and the Post-Liberal State, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 857
(1998). Researchers have long recognized that the perception of crime is shaped much more
by crime reporting than by the actual incidence of criminal behavior. See, e.g., F. James
Davis, Crime News in Colorado Newspapers, 57 AM. J. SOC. 325 (1952). For an early and
influential discussion of deviance as a socially constructed category, see HOWARD BECKER,
OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 7–18 (1963). Sadly, the gap between
reality and reporting continues to distort criminal justice policy, as alarmist accounts
continue to create the perception of peril. For a discussion of this in the context of juvenile
crime, see, e.g., Ernestine S. Gray, Media—Don’t Believe the Hype, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 45, 47 (2003) (“Clearly, the amount and quality of coverage by the media given to
issue of juvenile crime by the media does not reflect the reality of juvenile crime.”); Franklin
E. Zimring, The 1990s Assault on Juvenile Justice: Notes from an Ideological Battleground,
11 FED. SENT’G REP. 260 (1999) (“In the middle of the largest sustained decline in violent
crime in 30 years, these predictions of a ‘coming storm’ [of juvenile violence] suggest that
the Holy War about juvenile justice was neither wholly nor mainly a reaction to levels of
crime in the streets.”). The constructionist literature is voluminous. For a survey of the
literature and an attempt to lend it some empirical support, see THEODORE SASSON, CRIME
TALK: HOW CITIZENS CONSTRUCT A SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995).

744

JOSEPH MARGULIES

[Vol. 101

broad consensus over the phenomenon itself.74 No one credibly doubts that
American society has become distinctly more punitive in the past four
decades, 75 and that the punitive turn has included a major change in the
explanation for deviant behavior, which has in turn fundamentally altered
what is regarded as the state’s proper response. As never before, an
obsession with controlling deviance by eliminating risk dominates
American culture.
III. THE NEW PENOLOGY
It is not my goal to critique the punitive turn in American life. That
has been amply and ably done by the authors cited in the notes. My interest
is in the connection between the punitive turn and the demand for
preventive detention. To that end, it is enough to note that the punitive turn
represents two linked developments in American thought. The first is the
recurring creation in the public mind of the monster-criminal, a beast
beyond redemption or reform that is innately hostile to the community.
And the second is a dramatic decline in the faith of the rehabilitative ideal
as the proper response to this beast. 76 The former has changed who and
what we imagine the deviant to be, while the latter has changed how society
should respond. In the last several decades, and especially since the early
1980s, the criminal has been reimagined from one of us—a person for
whom society bears some responsibility and who must therefore be
reformed and rehabilitated—to one of them—a monster who must be
separated from us and whose behavior must be monitored and controlled.
Society’s responsibility is not to reform, since that is impossible. Crime,
and particularly violent crime, is inevitable, since criminals are
irredeemable. 77

74

See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 9, at 2 (“We still do not really know how we got from
there to here and why the crime control future—which is the present we now inhabit—turned
out to be so different from the one that was widely expected a generation ago.”); SIMON,
supra note 71, at 25 (“The question of causation is fascinating but ultimately less important
that the question of what the ‘war on crime’ actually does to American democracy, our
government and legal system, and the open society we have historically enjoyed.”).
75
See, e.g., Cullen, supra note 46, at 28–31 (reviewing literature and opinion polling to
document this shift).
76
Ironically, the earliest attacks on the rehabilitative ideal came from the political left,
which attacked the idea of rehabilitation as simply another constructed political category,
and therefore an illegitimate form of state control and a subterfuge for enforced conformity.
See, e.g., FRANCIS ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 32–59 (1981);
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1971).
77
Jonathan Simon has described the convergence of these two ideas in the context of the
criminal justice response to sex offenders:
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In response to the criminal as beast, modern criminal justice policy has
burdened itself with the Sisyphean task of controlling the uncontrollable.
The problem is not crime per se, which has declined steadily over the last
two decades, but the image of crime in the public mind. Because the
monster does not walk the street so much as haunt the imagination, he
casually shrugs off the pathetic attempts at social control repeatedly fired at
him by an anxious state. Nothing in the arsenal of the modern state can
solve the problem of a mythical beast. Like dragons, he disappears only
when people stop believing that he exists.78 But having created him,
politicians and pundits find it hard to let him go. The state is left, therefore,
with the challenge of feigning control, which requires the creation of ever
more repressive, ever more draconian systems of supervision and
management, all with an eye to reassuring a frightened population that the
monster, though still at large, can at least be kept at bay. 79
So explains what has been called the new penology, in which the faith
that the offender is one of us has given way to the belief that he is not; the
goal that he be reformed has given way to the certainty that reform is
impossible; and the ambition that he eventually be returned to society has
given way to the conviction that society is much better off without him. 80

The new generation of sex offender laws represents a shift toward the new penology combined
with a strong appeal to populist punitiveness. This takes the form of managerialism . . .
combined with gestures of identification with populist sentiments evoked by sex crimes. The
new penology is generally agnostic toward treatment. The goal is waste management. Populist
punitiveness is exceedingly hostile toward medicalization. The result is an important
transformation of the sex offender from the most obvious example of crime as disease back to an
earlier conception of crime as monstrosity. Sex offenders are our modern-day monsters,
producing tidal waves of public demand.

Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology, 4
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 452, 456 (1998) (emphasis added). Simon is aware of his
penchant for “perhaps overstated” polemics. See SIMON, supra note 71, at 4 (recognizing
that the title claim of the book—“that the American elite are ‘governing through crime’—is
polemical, and perhaps overstated”).
78
For an account of the life cycle of the dangerous sex offender in the public
imagination, see PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD
MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA (1998).
79
See generally ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (Mark Ritter
trans., Sage Publications 1992) (1986); SIMON, supra note 71, at 238 (“The federal
government and at least some states, including highly visible ones like Florida, Texas, and
California, have begun to make rituals of reassurance a primary government activity.”);
Ulrich Beck, The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited, 19 THEORY, CULTURE &
SOC’Y 39 (2002) (“The hidden central issue in world risk society is how to feign control over
the uncontrollable.”) (emphasis added).
80
See, e.g., GARLAND, supra note 9, at 1–16; Albert Alschuler, The Changing Purposes
of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the
Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2003); Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New
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The dominant goal of penal policy has shifted from social welfare to social
The “master plan” of the new penology calls for the
control. 81
identification, management, and control of those who would do the
community harm. 82 And because the harm the dangerous super-predator
would do is imagined to be apocalyptic, society cannot wait for the harm to
occur. Instead, it must act today, and impose its rule based not on
completed conduct but on future risk. 83 In the new penology, the role of the
state in dealing with dangerous crime is not simply to punish what was
done, but to prevent what may yet occur. 84 The bloodless sciences of risk
management and actuarial assessment achieve special prominence. 85 And
because society must attempt to manage risks of nearly unimaginable
magnitude, it must make assessments based on predictions of group
behavior. Anything else is dangerously inefficient. People are relevant not
for who they are, but for the group to which they belong, and thus for the
calculated risk they pose. 86 In the new penology, the individual is an
afterthought.
In service of this aspiration, the entire architecture of modern
criminology has been steadily reconfigured. Prison has been recast in the
American mind from “a mechanism of reform and rehabilitation” to “a
means of incapacitation and punishment that satisfies popular demands for
public safety and harsh retribution.” 87 A dissatisfaction with “experts,”
whose views are derided as naïve and anachronistic, has left a vacuum that
is increasingly filled by a populist and bipartisan demand for ever-more

Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30
CRIMINOLOGY 449 (1992).
81
BECKETT, supra note 72, at 10. Beckett credits Craig Reinerman for this turn of
phrase. See Craig Reinerman, The Social Construction of an Alcohol Problem: The Case of
Mothers Against Drunk Drivers and Social Control in the 1980s, 17 THEORY & SOC’Y 91
(1988).
82
See STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND
CLASSIFICATION 13–39 (1985).
83
See Clifford Shearing, Punishment and the Changing Face of Governance, 3
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 203 (2001).
84
See CLIVE NORRIS & GARY ARMSTRONG, THE MAXIMUM SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: THE
RISE OF CCTV 25 (1999).
85
See, e.g., Pat O’Malley, Risk and Responsibility, in FOUCAULT AND POLITICAL REASON:
LIBERALISM, NEO-LIBERALISM AND RATIONALITIES OF GOVERNMENT 189, 194 (Andrew
Barry, Thomas Osborne & Nikolas Rose eds., 1996) (stating that the actuarial focus on
amoral categories rather than individuals is taken as a source of efficiency which reduces
opposition).
86
E.g., Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices, 22 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 771, 773 (1988) (“Actuarial practices are emerging as a dominant force because they
further intensify the effectiveness of power set into motion by the rise of the disciplines.”).
87
GARLAND, supra note 9, at 14.
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repressive punishments. 88 The crime victim speaks with unique authority
while the law is subjected to particular scorn. Sanctions are too weak,
procedures are too technical, and public security is needlessly sacrificed in
favor of criminals’ “rights.”
Representative in this vein is the tragic rise and fall of the juvenile
“super-predator.” Violent juvenile crime rose precipitously in the mid
1980s, which triggered a sudden and widespread alarm. In 1995, the
conservative scholar James Q. Wilson wrote, “we are terrified by the
prospect of innocent people being gunned down at random, without
warning, and almost without motive, by youngsters who afterwards show us
the blank, unremorseful face of a feral, pre-social being.” 89 But it was
Wilson’s former student, former Princeton criminologist John DiIulio, who
gets the credit for coming up with the “super-predator” moniker. In a
much-cited article in the Weekly Standard, he expressed dismay at a “youth
crime wave” of “horrific proportions from coast to coast.” 90 But these were
not “normal” criminals, DiIulio said. They were “hardened, remorseless”
predators with “absolutely no respect for human life,” more dangerous than
the most vicious adult criminals, who “make even the leaders of the Bloods
and Crips . . . look tame by comparison.” 91 And just to dispel all doubt,
DiIulio assured us he was no timid naïf:
I will still waltz backwards, notebook in hand and alone, into any adult maximumsecurity cellblock full of killers, rapists, and muggers. But a few years ago, I forswore
research inside juvenile lock-ups. The buzz of impulsive violence, the vacant stares
and smiles, and the remorseless eyes were at once too frightening and too
92
depressing . . . .

But as bad as matters had become, DiIulio insisted it was about to get
much worse. “[W]hat is really frightening everyone,” he said, “is not
what’s happening now but what’s just around the corner—namely, a sharp
increase in the number of super crime-prone young males.” On the horizon,
DiIulio foresaw “tens of thousands” of “juvenile super-predators,” a tidal
wave of violence and mayhem “that hasn’t yet begun to crest”: 93

88
See, e.g., Franklin Zimring, Populism, Democratic Government, and the Decline of
Expert Authority: Some Reflections on “Three Strikes” in California, 28 PAC. L.J. 243, 252–
56 (1996).
89
James Q. Wilson, Crime and Public Policy, in CRIME 489, 492 (James Q. Wilson and
Joan Petersilia eds., 1995).
90
John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27,
1995, at 23.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
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They are perfectly capable of committing the most heinous acts of physical violence
for the most trivial reasons . . . . They fear neither the stigma of arrest nor the pain of
imprisonment. They live by the meanest code of the meanest streets, a code that
reinforces rather than restrains their violent, hair-trigger mentality. In prison or out,
the things that super-predators get by their criminal behavior—sex, drugs, money—
are their own immediate rewards. Nothing else matters to them. So for as long as
their youthful energies hold out, they will do what comes “naturally”: murder, rape,
94
rob, assault, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, and get high.

Fast on the heels of this article was the best-seller, Body Count: Moral
Poverty . . . and How to Win America’s War Against Crime and Drugs, coauthored by DiIulio, William Bennett, who headed the Office of Drug
Policy under the first President Bush, and John Walters, who had been
Bennett’s assistant and later became Executive Director of the Council on
Crime in America. 95 Expanding on the arguments DiIulio had made in the
Weekly Standard, the authors warned that “America is now home to
thickening ranks of juvenile ‘super-predators’—radically impulsive,
brutally remorseless youngsters, including ever more pre-teenage boys, who
murder, assault, rape, rob, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun-toting
gangs, and create communal disorders.” 96
To account for this new monster, DiIulio seized on what he called “a
conservative theory of the root causes of crime”—that is, “moral
poverty”: 97
Moral poverty is the poverty of being without loving, capable, responsible adults who
teach you right from wrong. It is the poverty of being without parents and other
authorities who habituate you to feel joy at others’ joy, pain at others’ pain, happiness
when you do right, and remorse when you do wrong. It is the poverty of growing up
in the virtual absence of people who teach morality by their own everyday example
98
and who insist that you follow suit.

Violent juvenile crime, in other words, had nothing to do with the
ready availability of guns or crack cocaine. It had nothing to do with the
collapse of inner-city infrastructures, economies, or support services.
Society bore no responsibility for creating the social conditions that
contributed to the breakdown of families, including the ravages caused by
the War on Drugs. In fact, violent juvenile crime had nothing to do with
anything for which society could conceivably be responsible. It was simply

94

Id.
WILLIAM BENNETT, JOHN J. DIIULIO JR., & JOHN WALTERS, BODY COUNT: MORAL
POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST POVERTY AND DRUGS (1996).
96
Id. at 27.
97
DiIulio, supra note 90.
98
Id.
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a matter of personal moral failure. Children “are most likely to become
criminally depraved when they are morally deprived.” 99
Though widely attacked by other scholars, the idea of the superpredator proved irresistible to the popular and political imagination.
Politicians and pundits enthusiastically embraced the idea that violent crime
was caused by the offender’s moral poverty and not society’s amoral
indifference or immoral neglect. Yet if it was their fault, it was nonetheless
our crisis. The problem was foisted upon a blameless society, which now
could only hope to manage and control it. And it was “a monster of a
problem,” the Washington Times warned. 100 “The super-predator is upon
us. The super-predator is a boy, a preteen and teen, who murders, rapes,
robs, assaults, does and deals in deadly drugs, joins gangs with guns,
terrorizes neighborhoods and sees no relationship between right and
wrong . . . . These boys are not so much demoralized as unmoralized.”101
They are “far more dangerous” than ‘normal’ criminals.” 102 In fact, they
“may be the biggest, baddest generation of criminals any society has ever
known.” 103 The media wrung its hands in apocalyptic worry. A TIME
headline predicted “[a] [t]eenage [t]imebomb,” 104 and U.S. News and World
Report fretted that “it may take an even greater bloodbath to force effective
crime solutions to the top of the nation’s agenda.” 105 “The tsunami is
coming,” Susan Estrich wrote in a 1996 column for USA Today. “Juvenile
crime is going up and getting worse.” 106
Simply in the nature of things, a crisis imagined as worse than all that
came before it will induce a skepticism about existing solutions—haven’t

99

Id.
Suzanne Fields, The Super-Predator, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1996, at A23.
101
Id.; see also, e.g., Sharon Mack, The Age of the Super Predator: Mainers Say Soaring
Juvenile Crime Portends Need for System Overhaul, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Maine), Apr. 24,
1996 (“The Super Predator, Portland Police Chief Mike Chitwood explains, is a male, 14 to
17 years old, with no remorse and no fear. He is young and heartless and has no sense of the
future.”); Warren Richey, Teen Crime Trend Puts Them Behind Adult Bars, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 2, 1997, at 4 (“America is being threatened by a growing cadre of coldblooded teens called ‘superpredators.’”).
102
Editorial, The Psychological Side of Lawlessness and the Central Role of
Incarceration, TAMPA TRIB., Aug. 5, 1997, at 6.
103
Gene Koprowski, The Rise of the Teen Super-Predator, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996,
at A17.
104
Richard Zogling, Now for the Bad News: A Teenage Timebomb, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996,
at 52.
105
Ted Gest & Victoria Pope, Crime Time Bomb, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 17,
1996, at 28.
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STEVE MACEK, URBAN NIGHTMARES: THE MEDIA, THE RIGHT, AND THE MORAL PANIC
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they already failed?—and a corresponding call for radical remedies.107 So it
was with the super-predator. As one Chicago prosecutor put it, the juvenile
code “was written at a time when kids were knocking over outhouses, not
killing people. We’re looking at a whole new breed here.” The sentiment
was widespread. A Brooklyn D.A. said the juvenile laws “were written at a
time when kids were throwing spitballs . . . . Now they’re committing
murders.” And the chief prosecutor in San Diego lamented, “Our juvenile
justice system was created at a time of more ‘Leave it to Beaver’ type
crimes, less sophisticated and not incredibly violent. But what we see
now . . . is kids who are real predators.” 108
In this way, the image of the super-predator—a tidal wave that could
not be stopped but might be controlled—triggered a call for tougher
juvenile laws, to which states responded with gusto. What changed in this
call was not the offender, but how society viewed and responded to him. In
keeping with the new penology, statutes “that had stressed ‘rehabilitation’
and ‘the best interests of the child’ were rewritten to emphasize
‘punishment’ and ‘the protection of the public.’”109 At the same time, the
American fondness for policy-by-sound-bite produced the catchy phrase,
“adult time for adult crime.” 110 Between 1990 and 1996, forty states
amended their laws to allow more children to be prosecuted as adults.
Between 1996 and 1999, forty-three states relaxed their transfer laws, most
acting for the second time in only a few years. 111 In 1998 alone, 200,000

107

Alas, it is ever thus, as the sociologist Edward Shils observed during the McCarthy

era:
In the United States the rule of law is deeply rooted in the interests of institutions and in a
powerful tradition. Alongside of it, however, runs a current of thought and sentiment, a
disposition towards ideological enthusiasm and political passions, which proclaim great crises
and announce their disbelief in the capacities of ordinary institutions and their leaders to resolve
them.

EDWARD SHILS, THE TORMENT OF SECRECY 161 (Arcturus Books 1974) (1956).
108
The three preceding quotes are taken from David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin,
Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused: The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile
Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 641 (2001). Of course, the halcyon days of
spitballs and outhouses never existed. A close study of the juvenile code in Chicago, for
instance, shows it was written with an eye to all manner of juvenile delinquent, and that early
twentieth-century legislators were no more indifferent to the risk of violent juvenile crime
than we are today. Id. at 648–49.
109
Id. at 642 (quoting MELISSA SICKMUND ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 30 (1997)).
110
See, e.g., Scott M. Fincher, Juvenile Crime Law Signed, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 1996, at
M3 (“Legislation requiring ‘adult time’ for ‘adult crime’ was signed into law Tuesday.”); Joe
Davidson, Clinton, Dole Getting Tough on Violent Juvenile Crime, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22,
1996, at A16 (describing Dole’s campaign against juvenile delinquency).
111
Id. at 643.

2011]

DEVIANCE, RISK, AND LAW

751

children were prosecuted as adults in the United States. 112 Defending this
trend, Florida Congressman Bill McCollum, when asked whether it was
really necessary for a federal law that would have allowed thirteen-yearolds to be prosecuted as adults, insisted, “They’re the predators out there.
They’re not children anymore. They’re the most violent criminals on the
face of the earth.” 113
Of course, the super-predator was a myth. The predicted explosion in
juvenile crime never materialized. By the time DiIulio coined the term,
juvenile crime rates had already begun to fall, and continued to decline
every year from 1994 to 2004. After two years of modest increases in
violent juvenile crime in 2005 and 2006, rates again began to fall and the
most recent data, published by the Department of Justice in December
2009, places juvenile violent crime rates at lower levels than at any point
throughout the 1990s. 114 And as crime rates fell, the super-predator theory
seemed increasingly far-fetched. In 2001, the Surgeon General issued a
massive report on juvenile violence that exhaustively surveyed the available
evidence. 115 Addressing themselves to the idea of the super-predator, the
authors concluded “there is no evidence that the young people involved in

112
Id. (citing AMNESTY INT’L, BETRAYING THE YOUNG: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
AGAINST CHILDREN IN THE US JUSTICE SYSTEM (1998), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/060/1998).
113
Morning Edition (National Public Radio broadcast June 25, 1996).
114
CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILE ARRESTS 2008, at 3 (2009), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/ojjdp/228479.pdf. There were, of course, variations within offense categories, and
rates for robbery showed a significant increase.

The number of juvenile arrests in 2008 for forcible rape was less than in any year since at least
1980, and the number of juvenile aggravated assault arrests in 2008 was less than in any year
since 1988. In contrast, after also falling to a relatively low level in 2004, juvenile arrests for
murder increased each year from 2005 to 2007, then declined 5% in 2008. However, juvenile
arrests for robbery increased more than 46% since 2004.

Id. at 4. Still, overall arrest rates for juveniles have fallen significantly, and with the
exception of robbery, from 1999 to 2008 rates for juveniles fell even more than the rates for
adults in every category of violent or serious offense. Id. For discussions and debunking of
the super-predator myth, see, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 3–16
(1998); Lara A. Bazelon, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy Is the
Preadolescent’s Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159 (2000); Mark Soler
et al., Juvenile Justice: Lessons for a New Era, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 483
(2009); Franklin E. Zimring, The Youth Violence Epidemic: Myth or Reality?, 33 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 727 (1998).
115
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL (2001), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/
youthviolence/toc.html.
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violence during the peak years of the early 1990s were more frequent or
more vicious offenders than youth in earlier years.” 116
Meanwhile, scholars who promoted the idea of the super-predator
admitted their mistake and expressed their regrets. DiIulio, for instance,
while praying at Mass on Palm Sunday in 1996, experienced an
“epiphany—a conversion of heart, a conversion of mind.” 117 In a flash, he
said he suddenly understood that the solution for juvenile crime was
treatment and prevention rather than incarceration and control. “God had
given me a Rolodex, good will and a passion that was sometimes
misdirected,” he said, “and I knew that for the rest of my life I would work
on prevention, on helping bring caring, responsible adults to wrap their
arms around these kids.” 118 In a commentary for the Wall Street Journal,
he complained of “Washington’s dangerously deluded dogmas about
crime . . . including the belief that most juvenile criminals are violent
‘super-predators’ who can be stopped by the threat of long, hard prison
terms.” 119 And when asked about his theory, all he could say was, “[t]hank
God we were wrong.” 120
****
The juvenile super-predator has gradually disappeared from the public
imagination. Yet he left an indelible mark, and not simply in the legal
damage he caused—statutory and jurisprudential wreckage that has endured
long after the ostensible justification has passed. The more important effect
of the super-predator fiasco was to reinforce the contemporary habit of the
American mind, the distinctive way of creating, understanding, and
responding to a perceived crisis of deviance and risk. 121 And so it was that
when one beast vanished and another reappeared, society “knew” what
must be done. Like the marauding teen, the serial sexual predator is a
monster beyond comprehension or reform. “Chronic sexual predators have

116

Id. at 5. The authors said the rise in juvenile violence “resulted primarily from a
relatively sudden change in the social environment—the introduction of guns into violent
exchanges among youths. The violence epidemic was, in essence, the result of a change in
the presence and type of weapon used, which increased the lethality of violent incidents.”
Id. at 44.
117
Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has Regrets,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at A19.
118
Id.
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John J. DiIulio Jr., Jail Alone Won’t Stop Juvenile Super-Predators, WALL ST. J., June
11, 1997, at A23.
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Becker, supra note 117.
121
Though he wrote about the new penology in the context of racial profiling, I believe
William Rose meant the same thing when he referred to “a new way of talking about
danger.” See William Rose, Crimes of Color: Risk, Profiling, and the Contemporary
Racialization of Social Control, 16 INT’L J. POL., CULTURE & SOC’Y 179, 185 (2002).
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crossed an osmotic membrane,” one prolific commentator about the matter
has observed; “They can’t step back to the other side—our side. And they
don’t want to . . . . [W]e have but one choice. Call them monsters and
isolate them.” 122
Like the juvenile super-predator, the sexual predator is imagined as
trapped in a pre-socialized state. His emotional and psychological
development is permanently stunted, frozen at a time that leaves him
forever dedicated to his own personal gratification. He cannot be
rehabilitated because he “cannot return to a state that never existed.” 123
And he cannot be cured, because he is not sick. He is simply evil, and
society must not confuse one with the other.124 “When it comes to the
sexual sadist, psychiatric diagnoses won’t protect us. Appeasement
endangers us. Rehabilitation is a joke.” The only safe solution is long-term
incarceration; “no-parole life sentences for certain sex crimes . . . offer our
only hope against an epidemic of sexual violence that threatens to pollute
our society beyond the possibility of its own rehabilitation.”125
In an important respect, however, the sexual predator is even more
dangerous than his juvenile counterpart. While the juvenile super-predator
was a new “breed” of criminal, a “feral, pre-social being,” at least in theory
he could, like any wild beast, be captured and imprisoned. But the sexual
predator is more cunning, more devious, and therefore more difficult to
monitor and control. 126 He can look and act just like “us,” and can stalk the
malls, the schoolyards, and, worst of all, the Internet with impunity, luring

122
Andrew Vachss, Sex Predators Can’t Be Saved, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1993, at A15; see
also John Douard, Sex Offender as Scapegoat: The Monstrous Other Within, 53 N.Y. L. SCH.
L. REV. 31 (2008).
123
Vachss, supra note 122.
124
Andrew Vachss, What We Must Do . . . to Protect Our Children, PARADE MAG., July
14, 2002, at 5.
125
Vachss, supra note 122; see also Andrew Vachss, How to Handle Sexual Predators,
WORLD & I, Aug. 1993, available at http://vachss.com/av_dispatches/disp_9308_a.html
(“There is an old saying about monsters that we ought to heed: You don’t know where
they’re going, but you can always tell where they’ve been. Once an offender has shown us
he has clearly embarked on the predator’s bloody road, it is our responsibility to make that
road a dead end.”).
126
Consider, for instance, the remarks of Congressman McCollum in support of the
Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996: “It is well recognized that sexual
predators are remarkably clever and persistently transient. The offenders are not confined
within state lines, and neither should our efforts to keep track of them.” Mona Lynch,
Pedophiles and Cyber-predators as Contaminating Forces: The Language of Disgust,
Pollution, and Boundary Invasions in Federal Debates on Sex Offender Legislation, 27 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 529, 545 (2002) (quoting 142 CONG. REC. H11130 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Betsy McCollum)).
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impressionable children and lonely women with a façade of normalcy. 127
The juvenile super-predator is a savage beast, dangerous but containable,
but the sexual predator is a diabolical fiend, clever and elusive. 128
And this perceived difference has given the response to the sexual
predator a characteristic form. We treated the juvenile super-predator as an
adult, but generally no worse—warehousing him in the same place and the
same way. But the sexual predator inspires a sense of disgust and
depravity. 129 We fear infection—that he will slip beyond the bounds of
“them” and contaminate “us.” He is imagined not simply as a monster, but
as a deadly virus that must be permanently quarantined. His presence must
be announced, his location known, his movement recorded. Speaking in
support of the Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, for
instance, Joe Biden, then a Democratic Senator from Delaware, said, “We
now seek to build a system where all movements of sexually violent and
child offenders can be tracked and we will go a long way toward the day
when none of these predators will fall between the cracks.” 130 A Louisiana
version of the ubiquitous community notification statute required the
released offender to mail details about his record to his neighbors. In urban
areas, this meant everyone within a three-block area. In Oregon, as a
condition of parole, an ex-convict was required to post a sign on his front
door that read, “Dangerous Sex Offender—No Children Allowed.” 131 In
many other jurisdictions, he may not live within shouting distance of the
parks, schools, and playgrounds where he habitually trolls for victims. 132
Instead, he must be isolated and contained, like a disease.
As with the juvenile super-predator, the state and federal legislatures
responded enthusiastically to the perceived crisis of sexual predators.
Sentences for convicted sex offenders have increased dramatically.
California passed a “one strike” law in 1994, which mandated a twentyfive-year sentence, with a minimum of fifteen years to be served prior to
parole eligibility, for certain types of sex offenses. 133 It followed this in
1996 with a law calling for non-voluntary chemical castration of child
127

See, e.g., Andrew Vachss, If We Really Want to Keep Our Children Safe . . . , PARADE
MAG., May 2, 1999, at 5 (“Predatory pedophiles are experts at camouflage. Virtually all of
their approaches to children are made under a benign guise—offering ‘friendship’ or
‘understanding.’ For every child molester who leaps out of a van wearing a ski mask to grab
a victim, there are thousands whose weapons are deception and guile.”).
128
See, e.g., JENKINS, supra note 78, at 189–214.
129
Lynch, supra note 126, at 538–54.
130
Id. at 553 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S3421 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Joseph Biden)).
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JENKINS, supra note 78, at 200.
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Id. at 200–01.
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molesters, which is mandatory after the second conviction and discretionary
after the first, where discretion resides with the sentencing judge. 134 A
number of states followed suit and passed similar laws permitting chemical
castration for some sex offenders.135 In 1994, Congress passed the Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act, named for a child abducted in Minnesota in 1989. 136 The
law provided that federal money would be withheld from states that did not
have sex offender registration systems in place. 137 All states now have such
systems. 138 Two years later, Congress passed Megan’s Law, named for a
child killed by a repeat sex offender in New Jersey. 139 Megan’s Law
amended the Wetterling Act to require that states also establish a
Though these approaches vary
community notification system. 140
somewhat from state to state, they all require that sex offenders provide
their whereabouts to law enforcement, and sometimes to the broader
community. Many of these statutes forbid sex offenders from living within
a specified distance of places where children might gather, including parks,
schools, malls, skating rinks, swimming pools, etc. 141 And finally, a
number of states and the federal government have passed legislation
allowing for the continued confinement of certain sex offenders even after
they complete their sentence. 142
Not surprisingly, the response to the sexual marauder has been no
more grounded in reality than the earlier response to the juvenile superpredator. To begin with, and contrary to the image that haunts the popular
imagination, the largest number of sex offenders—and the overwhelming
majority of offenders who abuse children—are not strangers who leap from
134
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136
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Pam Lynchner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.
§ 14072 (2006).
140
Id. § 14071 (amended 1996).
141
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (West 2009) (forbidding certain sex
offenders from residing within 2,000 feet of schools, public parks, youth centers, or daycare
facilities); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (West 2010) (imposing residence restriction
on sex offenders whose victims were under the age of eighteen); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2224B-23 (2010) (forbidding sex offenders from living within a “community safety zone”).
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See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (Supp. 2003). These provisions survived due
process challenges. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346 (1997). In United States v. Comstock, the Court held that Congress had authority under
the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact a federal version of this statute. 130 S. Ct. 1949,
1954 (2010); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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behind the bushes or prowl on the Internet, but family members, friends,
and acquaintances. 143 Tracking strangers who move from state to state, or
forcing sex offenders to announce their presence to the community, may
make for good television but has very little to do with sound criminal
justice policy. In addition, and once again contrary to the accepted wisdom,
the recidivism rates for sex offenders are actually quite low. Most studies
show that approximately 3–5% of sex offenders are rearrested for a new sex
offense within three years of their release, and even fewer are
reconvicted. 144 And finally, the reliable prediction that a particular person
will reoffend—the ostensible foundation for preventive detention regimes—
is simply beyond the expertise of modern science. As one researcher
recently put it, “clinical predictions of future dangerousness, including
sexual recidivism, are notoriously subjective and prone to bias and are
frequently wrong.” 145 None of this seems to matter, however, and public
thought continues to dwell on the monster believed to be in our midst.
****
The response to both the juvenile super-predator and the sexual
predator reveals a now-distinctive habit of mind. The marauder prompts
images of subhuman deviance and apocalyptic risk. A blameless society
faces imminent destruction and demands immediate protection. Politicians
respond with the tools that have become most familiar—punishment and
control. And the pattern described for these particular beasts is merely
representative. The overlapping response to the “epidemics” of drugs 146
and gang violence 147 has been much the same. Together, they illustrate
143

See CHARLES PATRICK EWING, JUSTICE PERVERTED: SEX OFFENSE LAW, PSYCHOLOGY,
PUBLIC POLICY xvi–vii (2011). According to the 2004 National Crime Victimization
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those involving boys 0 to 5, 4.6 percent of those involving boys 6 to 11, and 7.6 percent of
those involving boys 12 to 17.” Id. at xvii.
144
Id. at 33–35.
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engaged in competitive extracurricular activities based in part on “the nationwide epidemic
of drug use”); Katherine Beckett, Setting the Public Agenda: “Street Crime” and Drug Use
in American Politics, 41 SOC. PROBS. 425 (1994); Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine,
Crack in Context: Politics and the Media in the Making of a Drug Scare, 16 CONTEMP.
DRUG PROBS. 535 (1989).
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Class, and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 531,
540 (1997) (“The term ‘gang banger’ invokes an image of violent young black men who are
involved in activities such as drug dealing and prostitution.”); Erik Luna, The Models of
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how contemporary American society has come to understand deviance and
what it now demands in order to eliminate all risk. 148
IV. THE PUNITIVE TURN IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The punitive turn in American life has been greatly facilitated by a
parallel shift in the law of criminal procedure. Over the past several
decades, the Supreme Court has steadily reoriented the doctrine to favor
conservative approaches to deviance and risk. 149
At the risk of
oversimplification, one can imagine criminal procedure operating at two
poles. At one pole, criminal procedure can be conceived as the deliberate
imposition of state power into the lives of those present within the
community, either by surveillance, arrest, prosecution, or other forms of
social control. But the people who may suffer from this imposition of state
power are not only part of the community, they are presumptively innocent,
and therefore presumptively free to go about their affairs. Because the
exercise of state power has the inherent potential for oppression and
arbitrariness, to the detriment of these rights, it must be cabined. At the
other pole, it is also possible to conceive of criminal procedure as a
protection against lawlessness. It exists as an essential prerogative of the
state—viz., the power to make and enforce those rules which are necessary
to maintain order and protect the public from the threat represented by
criminals, who have shown by their conduct to be outside the community
entitled to the state’s protection. It adopts a distinctly adversarial stance
toward the criminal element, with no pretense that they are “like us.”150

Criminal Procedure, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 389, 391 (1999) (discussing Chicago’s gang
loitering ordinance to illustrate the tendency of criminal procedure doctrine to “heed the
apocalyptic call and disregard the bedrock precedents of the past to suppress the alleged
crisis of the present”).
148
Indeed, at a more general level, the punitive response is not confined to criminology.
Daniel Rodgers has recently shown how the steps leading up to the Welfare Reform Act of
1996 followed much the same pattern: the demonization of the poor, who were exclusively
to blame for their poverty, and who must be punished by removing the incentives in welfare
which encourage them to remain impoverished. See DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE
201–09 (2011).
149
See, e.g., Louis Bilionis, Criminal Justice After the Conservative Reformation, 94
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conservative redirection in criminal justice. The Court heeded the call.”).
150
This model is akin to Herbert Packer’s vision of criminal procedure as the contest
between due process and crime control. See HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION (1968). There is a distinct sense in which Packer’s model is not useful to the new
penology, since he clearly anticipated that the criminal process would be used to investigate,
prosecute, and punish wrongdoers for past crimes rather than to prevent the commission of
future crimes. See id.; see also Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal
Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185 (1983).
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It should be immediately apparent that these two conceptions will lead
to dramatically different legal regimes. In the former, an aggressive
constabulary is seen as the potential source of totalitarian abuse; in the
latter, it is the obvious answer to social chaos. In one, law enforcement is a
problem to be restrained; in the other, it is a solution to be unleashed. And
in the past fifty years, the unmistakable trend in the doctrine has been to
favor the second vision over the first. Notwithstanding occasional outliers
like Florida v. J.L. 151 or Kyllo v. United States, 152 the Court has proven
remarkably willing to accommodate, and advance, the punitive turn in
American culture. Since the late 1960s, the Court has steadily expanded the
power of the government to monitor, stop, arrest, interrogate, and imprison
people suspected of criminal behavior, to keep them there for extended
periods, and to continue their detention indefinitely, even after their
sentences have ended. 153
These developments have been the subject of endless commentary,
which I do not repeat here. 154 My discussion assumes a basic familiarity
with the doctrine and focuses instead on the close relationship between the
developing jurisprudence and the broader cultural preference for the
punitive turn. 155 Though it is dangerous to reduce this entire trend to a
151

529 U.S. 266, 266 (2000) (finding that police may not stop and frisk a person “solely
from a call made from an unknown location by an unknown caller” that “a young black male
standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun”). Still, the
Court left open the possibility that a different tip involving a greater risk of harm—perhaps
that a Muslim-looking woman was at a bus stop wearing a burqa and carrying a bomb—
might be enough. Id. at 273–74.
152
533 U.S. 27, 29, 40 (2001) (“[T]he use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private
home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
153
For an argument that cases like Kyllo and J.L. were not outliers but rather a part of a
countertrend against the “conservative reformation” of the ‘80s and ‘90s, see Louis D.
Bilionis, Conservative Reformation, Popularization, and the Lessons of Reading Criminal
Justice as Constitutional Law, 52 UCLA L. REV. 979, 1032 (2005). From the perspective of
five additional years, Dean Bilionis’s prediction seems to have been premature.
154
For a discussion of the literature, see Arenella, supra note 150, at 185–97. Much of
this literature contrasts the Warren Court with the Burger and Rehnquist Courts and
concludes the former was not as radically liberal, and the latter not as radically conservative,
as they are often portrayed. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was it Really so
Defense-Minded?), the Burger Court (Is it Really so Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police
Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T
62, 62–91 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983). My interest is in the overall trend of the doctrine and its
accommodation of the punitive turn rather than a comparison of one Court to another.
155
For a discussion of how the law shapes the popular imagination by conferring
legitimacy on cultural trends, see, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 3 (1991) (“This legalization of popular culture is
both cause and consequence of our increasing tendency to look to law as an expression of the
few values that are widely shared in our society: liberty, equality, and the ideal of justice
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single sentiment, I suggest it represents the triumph of the view expressed
by then-Justice Rehnquist in Illinois v. Gates, the 1984 decision which
replaced the Aguilar–Spinelli two-pronged test for probable cause based on
an informant’s tip with a more flexible and deferential inquiry into “the
totality of the circumstances.” 156 By itself, the decision is simply part of the
overall trend, vesting more authority in local law enforcement and imposing
corresponding limits on both the magistrate who is asked to issue a warrant
and the judge who is called to review it. 157 But far more important was
Justice Rehnquist’s observation, apropos of nothing, that the Aguilar–
Spinelli test poorly served “the most basic function of any government,”
which, he said, was “to provide for the security of the individual and of his
property.” 158
This language, lifted from Justice White’s dissent in Miranda v.
Arizona, 159 reflects a dramatic shift in judicial thinking. Certainly the view
it expresses is not self-evident; one could just as easily say, for instance,
that “the most basic function of any government” is to provide for the
welfare of its members, or to guarantee the rights of its members, or to
ensure the liberty of its members. Any one of these formulations could
provide for the security of individuals and their property but nonetheless
lead to a set of rules that would tend to protect against the encroachments of
law enforcement. One could likewise say that “the most basic function of
any government” is to promote a free and open society. This too could
provide for the security of individuals and their property but would again
suggest a different and more limited role for the machinery of law
enforcement. Instead, Justice Rehnquist elevated security to a uniquely
privileged status, which in turn leads to a set of rules that tend to permit and
facilitate rather than cabin and restrain the state. The point, of course, is not
that one view is conclusively superior to another or that this orientation will
under law . . . . Legality, to a great extent, has become a touchstone for legitimacy.”);
JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM 1 (1964) (defining legalism as “the ethical attitude that holds
moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties
and rights determined by rules”); Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 5, at 456–57.
156
462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983).
157
Id. at 236.
158
Id. at 237 (emphasis added) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966)
(White, J. dissenting)).
159
384 U.S. at 539 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White cited Lanzetta v. New Jersey
where the Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague a New Jersey statute which had
criminalized membership in “a gang.” 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939), (“The challenged
provision condemns no act or omission; the terms it employs to indicate what it purports to
denounce are so vague, indefinite and uncertain that it must be condemned as repugnant to
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). The Court noted the statute had
been construed by the state court, which, in dicta, wrote that “[t]he primary function of
government . . . is to render security to its subjects.” Id. at 455.
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necessarily lead to a different result in every case, but simply that Justice
Rehnquist’s view represents a striking victory for the punitive turn. 160
This victory has found expression throughout the doctrine. For
instance, the Court has steadily expanded the universe of allowable police
investigation by shrinking the reach of the Fourth Amendment. In Katz v.
United States, the 1967 landmark decision, the Court struck down the
warrantless electronic surveillance of a phone booth used by Katz for his
interstate gambling. 161 Katz was a structural decision that reflected a
suspicion of law enforcement and a preference for judicial oversight in
order to ensure a free and open society. As the Court noted, the FBI agents
in Katz acted with undeniable restraint:
They did not begin their electronic surveillance until investigation of the petitioner’s
activities had established a strong probability that he was using the telephone in
question to transmit gambling information to persons in other States . . . . Moreover,
the surveillance was limited, both in scope and in duration, to the specific purpose of
establishing the contents of the petitioner’s unlawful telephonic communications. The
agents confined their surveillance to the brief periods during which he used the
telephone booth, and they took great care to overhear only the conversations of the
162
petitioner himself.

In addition, the agents relied on the prior Supreme Court decision in
Olmstead v. United States, which held that electronic surveillance without
trespass and without seizure of tangible property did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 163
The Court in Katz was unmoved:
[T]he inescapable fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not
by a judicial officer. They were not required, before commencing the search, to
present their estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate.
They were not compelled, during the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise
limits established in advance by a specific court order. Nor were they directed, after
the search had been completed, to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that
164
had been seized.

To some, this no doubt seemed like a triumph of form over substance,
the needless elevation of legal technicalities that frustrated the reasonable,
good faith efforts of zealous and creative law enforcement. To the Court in
160

Compare 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *124 (stating that the goal of
society is “to protect individuals in the enjoyment of . . . rights . . . which could not be
preserved in peace without that mutual assistance and intercourse which is gained by the
institution of friendly and social communities”). I am grateful to my colleague Al Alschuler
for bringing this to my attention.
161
389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
162
Id. at 354.
163
Id. at 352 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464 (1928)).
164
Id. at 356.
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1967, however, it was simply adherence to the constitutional requirement
“that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be
interposed between the citizen and the police.”165
Yet the test that emerged from Katz was articulated by Justice Harlan
in concurrence: a search occurred only if the petitioner exhibited an
expectation of privacy that society was prepared to recognize as
reasonable. 166 The inherent subjectivity of this inquiry has allowed the
Court to accommodate the punitive turn by gradually shrinking the area
protected by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the police may conduct a
warrantless search of privately owned fields adjacent to one’s home even if
the owner has taken special steps to prevent the public from trespassing
unlawfully on the land. 167 They may search structures close to the home
but beyond the curtilage, even if the owner has taken elaborate precautions
to ensure the privacy of those structures.168 They may search structures
within the curtilage, even if they cannot be seen from the street, so long as
they may be seen by a plane flying overhead.169 And they may search
structures within the curtilage that cannot be seen from the street, and
cannot be seen from a plane flying overhead, so long as they can be seen
from a low-flying helicopter. 170 They may not, however, ascertain the
content of one’s home without a warrant unless they do so by the use of an
officer’s unenhanced senses. 171
Just as the police have greater latitude to search, they have greater
authority to arrest. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the Court held that
police could make a custodial arrest for any offense, even one for which the
maximum penalty did not include the possibility of incarceration.172 This,
of course, entitles the police to conduct a warrantless search incident to the
arrest 173 and to conduct a warrantless inventory search of any impounded
vehicle. 174 A number of municipalities tried to limit Atwater by making it a
violation of state law to arrest a person for a fine-only offense. But in
Virginia v. Moore, the Court held that an officer who violates such a law

165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Id. at 357 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481–82 (1963).
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 175–77 (1984).
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 302–03 (1987).
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 755–56 (1969).
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976).
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does not also violate the Fourth Amendment, which means a person may be
arrested and jailed for a fine-only offense even if the arrest is illegal.175
Though Atwater and Moore dramatically expanded the state’s power to
arrest (and therefore to search), that authority was at least restrained by the
requirement that the arrest be based on probable cause. But of course, since
Terry v. Ohio, the police have been allowed to stop and frisk a person based
only on a lesser showing of reasonable suspicion. 176 In Terry, the Court
struggled to strike a workable balance between the interests of the state in
effective law enforcement and the interest of the individual in personal
liberty. 177 Ultimately, the Court held that an officer may stop a person if he
can articulate something more than a bare hunch that criminal activity is
afoot, and may frisk him if he has a reasonable concern for his safety. 178 As
with Katz, however, the Court in subsequent cases has given Terry an
expansive reading. Innocent explanations for “suspicious” behavior are
waved off, and sinister explanations are accepted based on the ostensibly
superior judgment of experienced police officers.179 This accounts for cases
like Illinois v. Wardlow, where the Court held that running away at the sight
of an officer in a high-crime neighborhood, without more, is grounds for a
Terry stop. 180 In addition, the Court has applied Terry in circumstances
quite beyond its original justification, including, for instance, the seizure
and intrusive search of foreign nationals at the border.181
In much the same way, the protections extended to an accused during
police interrogations have been gradually whittled away. In Miranda v.
Arizona, the Court held that a custodial interrogation had to be preceded by
a set of warnings lest the interrogation run afoul of the privilege against
self-incrimination.182 Since that decision, the Court has steadily narrowed
its scope by: taking a crabbed reading of “custody” and “interrogation”;183
175

128 S. Ct. 1598, 1607 (2008). Certainly, a state could limit Atwater by directing that
a violation of state law required dismissal of the underlying offense, which could provide a
remedy even in the absence of the Fourth Amendment. The law in Moore, however, was not
of this character. See VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-74 (2004).
176
392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
177
See id. at 22–27.
178
Id. at 27.
179
See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (“A determination that
reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.”);
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (finding reasonable suspicion based on
decision of bystander to run from police in a high-crime neighborhood).
180
See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–25.
181
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985).
182
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
183
See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666–67 (2004) (age and experience
with law enforcement should not be taken into account to determine when a person is
considered in custody); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990) (questions asked by an
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ruling that it does not prohibit most forms of police trickery; 184 and holding
that it does not apply either to impeachment or to questioning that protects
“public safety.” 185 And in United States v. Patane, a plurality found that a
Miranda violation does not prevent the admission of subsequently-seized
physical evidence located as a product of the unlawful statement. 186 It is
not for nothing that the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, when he upheld
Miranda in Dickerson v. United States, was able to ignore his long-standing
criticism of the 1966 landmark decision with the jaunty but accurate
assessment that intervening cases had substantially lessened its impact. 187
Far better, therefore, to leave the case as a symbol of American
commitment to due process even though it has been all but stripped of its
potency. 188
Just as the Court has gradually made it easier for the police to stop,
frisk, arrest, search, and interrogate, they have also made it easier for
prosecutors to convict. For instance, even when a search is conducted
without a warrant, the many exceptions to the Warrant Clause—hot
pursuit, 189 plain view, 190 automobiles, 191 checkpoints, 192 “special needs,” 193
undercover officer posing as a cellmate do not constitute an interrogation sufficient to trigger
Miranda); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301–02 (1980) (a conversation between
officers in earshot of a suspect does not constitute an interrogation because “police surely
cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions”); Oregon
v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494–95 (1977) (no Miranda warnings are required when a
suspect is told he is not under arrest).
184
E.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 738–39 (1969) (an officer’s false statement about
evidence against a suspect did not render his subsequent confession coerced).
185
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984) (“[T]here is a ‘public safety’
exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect’s answers
may be admitted into evidence, and the availability of that exception does not depend upon
the motivation of the individual officers involved.”); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224
(1971) (holding that Miranda does not bar the use of coerced statements for impeachment
purposes, so long as those statements are deemed trustworthy).
186
542 U.S. 630, 633–34 (2004).
187
530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
188
Id. at 444.
189
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967) (“The Fourth Amendment does not
require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely
endanger their lives or the lives of others.”).
190
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 142 (1990) (holding that if lawfully present,
police may seize evidence in plain view, without a warrant, if incriminating character is
immediately apparent).
191
Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1714 (2009); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 153 (1925).
192
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004) (explaining that checkpoint stops do not
require individualized suspicion in order to pass constitutional muster); Mich. Dep’t State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding that the state’s interest in preventing drunk
driving outweighs intrusion upon an individual motorist who is stopped at checkpoint).
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exigent circumstances,194 border crossings, 195 inventory searches, 196 etc.—
make it a good bet the search will be upheld. And even if it is not, the
increasing resistance to the exclusionary rule means the evidence is not
likely to be suppressed. 197 In the same spirit, the Court has held that
remarkably punitive sentences do not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 198 To be sure, the Court in
Graham v. Florida recently put at least some limit on these developments,
but one should recall the question presented in Graham—viz., whether,
consistent with the Eighth Amendment, a juvenile who did not kill may
nonetheless be sentenced to spend the rest of his life in prison without the

193
Bd. of Educ. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825,
835 (2002) (upholding warrantless drug testing of all students involved in extracurricular
activities, regardless of whether there was a history of a serious drug problem in the school);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649, 657, 664–65 (1995) (upholding
suspicionless and warrantless drug testing of student athletes because such students had
decreased expectation of privacy, the search was unobtrusive, and drugs were a problem at
the school).
194
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[L]aw enforcement officers
may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant
or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.”); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753
(1984) (“[A]n important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency
exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made.”).
195
United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004) (law enforcement may,
without a warrant, “remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle’s fuel tank” when that
search occurs at the border); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977)
(“[S]earches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to
protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are
reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.”).
196
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (“Even if less intrusive means existed
of protecting some particular types of property, it would be unreasonable to expect police
officers in the everyday course of business to make fine and subtle distinctions in deciding
which containers or items may be searched and which must be sealed as a unit.”); South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372 (1976) (“[I]nventories pursuant to standard police
procedures are reasonable.”).
197
Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698 (2009) (when police error, though
unconstitutional, is “isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest,” no exclusion is
required); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988) (no exclusion if police can
show independent source); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984) (no exclusion if
police acted in good faith); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (no exclusion if
police can establish inevitable discovery).
198
See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961, 996 (1991) (no constitutional
objection to sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for possession of
cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370–71, 374–75 (1982) (no constitutional problem
in forty-year sentence and $20,000 fine for possession and distribution of nine ounces of
marijuana); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 266, 285 (1980) (no constitutional problem
with sentence of life in prison for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses under the “three
strikes” law).
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possibility of parole. 199 The mere fact that the question arose shows the
extent to which the punitive turn has taken hold in American sentencing.
And finally, the Court has approved at least some preventive detention
regimes. In United States v. Salerno, for instance, the Court upheld the Bail
Reform Act, which authorizes preventive detention prior to trial. 200 In
Kansas v. Hendricks 201 and Kansas v. Crane, 202 the Court upheld a statute
authorizing indefinite, involuntary detention of sex offenders who have
completed their sentences but continue to find it difficult to control their
sexual impulses. And in United States v. Comstock, the Court held that
Congress had authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact a
federal version of this statute. 203
In the final analysis, criminal procedure doctrine illustrates quite well
the continuing cross-pollination between law and culture. As American
thought has taken a punitive turn, the doctrine has steadily accommodated
the growing clamor for public safety. And as the Court has repeatedly
justified its doctrinal shifts by emphasizing the need for public safety, it has
helped to create the very cultural demand it seeks to satisfy. The result is a
kind of dialectic, where increased demand for punitive sanctions is used to
justify changes in the doctrine, and changes in the doctrine create space for
increasingly punitive sanctions. It is not a one-way ratchet, of course, and
matters do not spiral endlessly toward only one outcome, but for the last
forty years they have certainly moved in one direction far more easily than
the other.

199

30 S. Ct. 2011, 2017–18 (2010).
481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987).
201
521 U.S. 346 (1997).
202
534 U.S. 407 (2002).
203
130 S. Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010) (applying U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18). It would
certainly be a mistake to suggest that cases like Salerno and Hendricks resolve the present
debate over preventive detention. In Salerno, for instance, the indicted defendant faced the
prospect of an imminent prosecution, which mitigated the impact of the statute and
eliminated the risk of indefinite detention without legal process. See 481 U.S. at 747. And
in Hendricks and Crane, the statute under review applied to prisoners who had already been
convicted of a sexual assault and who, because of a diagnosed condition, found it difficult to
control their conduct. Crane, 534 U.S. at 410; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 352. The call for
preventive detention of suspected terrorists, however, takes these developments a step
further. Today, the suggestion is advanced that detention could be based solely on
predictions about future dangerousness, and for which past conduct and the petitioner’s
mental state may be relevant but are not essential to the Government’s case. In this sense,
the call for preventive detention of suspected terrorists is really a demand for anticipatory
detention—detention purely in anticipation of what the person may do, without regard to
what he may have done in the past, and without regard to his ability to restrain himself.
200
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V. PREVENTIVE DETENTION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS
The foregoing, which provides a snapshot of the punitive turn in
American thought, is meant to capture the American state of mind—at least
with respect to deviance and risk—when the planes struck the buildings.
A. THE TERRORIST AS SUPER-PREDATOR

Within days of the attacks of 9/11, an image of the Islamic terrorist
began to emerge that was built from the same rhetorical resources that
Americans have successfully employed for the past several decades to
construct a never-ending series of super-predators. The terrorists, like any
predator, were inherently malevolent. The “attacks of September 11,” John
Ashcroft told the House Committee on the Judiciary, “drew a bright line of
There is no
demarcation between the civil and the savage.” 204
understanding them, for they are simply evil. “We are in a conflict between
good and evil,” President Bush said, “and America will call evil by its
name.” 205 More beast than man, terrorists live on the “hunted margin” 206 of
mankind and have rejected “those values that separate us from animals—
compassion, tolerance, mercy.” 207 They are “parasites,” 208 a “scourge,” 209
an “evil and inhuman group of men,” 210 who spread their “cancer,” 211 their
“spawn,” 212 throughout the civilized world.
Sadly, this was not simply the language of politicians or the right. In
2002, Alan Dershowitz published Why Terrorism Works. 213 Terrorism
works, he wrote, “because its perpetrators believe that by murdering
innocent civilians they will succeed in attracting the attention of the world
204

Attorney General John Ashcroft, Testimony Before the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Sept. 24, 2001), available at 2001 WL 1132414.
205
President George W. Bush, Commencement Address at the United States Military
Academy at West Point (June 1, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/06/01/international/02PTEX-WEB.html).
206
President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Chief Executive Officers Summit in
Shanghai (Oct. 20, 2001).
207
U.S. Ambassador Howard H. Baker, Jr., Remarks at Japanese Observance Ceremony
for Victims of Terrorism in the U.S. (Sept. 23, 2001).
208
President George W. Bush, Statement Before the 56th Regular Session of the UN
General Assembly (Nov. 10, 2001).
209
CNN Interview on Anti-Terrorism Campaign (CNN television broadcast Sept. 16,
2001) (statement of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell).
210
U.S. Ambassador Howard H. Baker, Jr., Remarks at Japanese Observance Ceremony
for Victims of Terrorism in the U.S. (Sept. 23, 2001).
211
Admiral Dennis Blair, Office of the U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command,
Taking Back Our World from Osama bin Laden, GLOBAL SECURITY (Oct. 23, 2001),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2001/11/mil-011101-usia07.htm.
212
Id.
213
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS (2002).
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to their perceived grievances.” 214 Since that is what terrorists want, society
must not give it to them: We must commit ourselves never to try to
understand or eliminate its alleged root causes, but rather to place it
beyond the pale of dialogue and negotiation.” 215 These are not people with
whom you can negotiate. Instead,
they are like cunning beasts of prey: we cannot reason with them, but we can—if we
work at it—outsmart them, set traps for them, cage them, or kill them. The difference
is, of course, that they are much smarter than the most cunning of beasts. Indeed, we
must operate on the assumption that they are as smart as we are, but more determined,
more single-minded, more ruthless, and less constrained by morality, decency, and
216
legality.

In a few short sentences, Dershowitz adopts the tropes of the criminal as
superhuman predator—less than human, but so much more dangerous.
This rhetoric became somewhat more concrete, if no less hyperbolic,
once it could be directed at actual people. When the first prisoners arrived
at Guantanamo, senior Administration officials promptly described them as
“among the most dangerous, best trained vicious killers on the face of the
earth.” 217 They were “the worst of a very bad lot,” 218 and “very dangerous
people,” who “would gnaw hydraulic lines in the back of a C-17 to bring it
down.” 219 Hyperbolic foolishness like this has proven remarkably durable.
“Those men who are at Gitmo are the meanest, nastiest killers in the
world,” fulminated Republican Congressman Chris Chambliss of Georgia
in 2009, speaking in opposition to the President’s plan to close
Guantanamo. 220 “Every single one of them wakes up every day thinking of
ways they can kill and harm Americans, both our soldiers as well as
individuals.” 221 Representative Chambliss did not trifle himself with the
fact that the Obama Administration has cleared the majority of prisoners at

214

Id. at 24.
Id. at 24–25.
216
Id. at 182.
217
Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Defense, Press Briefing en route to Guantanamo Bay
(Jan.
27,
2002)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2320).
218
Tim Gold & Don Van Natta, Jr., U.S. Said to Overstate Value of Guantanamo
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2004, at A1 (quoting Vice President Dick Cheney).
219
General Richard Myers, Department of Defense News Briefing (Jan. 11, 2002)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2031).
220
155 CONG. REC. S11,145 (Nov. 5, 2009).
221
Id.
215
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the base for release. 222 Like any ideology, these beliefs are fast becoming
impervious to fact.
Of course, the essential counterpoint to evil is innocence. Just as post9/11 rhetoric described the terrorist in the familiar language of the modern
criminal super-predator, it invoked the innocence of American society to
fend off any heretical suggestion that U.S. foreign policy could have
contributed, even remotely, to the attacks. In his first address to Congress
after the attacks, President Bush famously pronounced the answer to the
question, “Why?” “They hate what they see right here in this Chamber, a
democratically elected government . . . . They hate our freedoms, our
freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and
assemble and disagree with each other.” 223 “They can’t stand what America
stands for,” he said later. 224 “It must bother them greatly to know we’re
such a free and wonderful place—a place where all religions can flourish; a
place where women are free; a place where children can be educated. It
must grate on them greatly.” 225 And on the day of the attacks, Bush said,
“America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for
freedom and opportunity in the world.” 226
This rhetoric has been exhaustively critiqued. In particular, the social
construction of the evil Islamic terrorist and innocent American victim has
been thoroughly reprised in the post-9/11 literature, and need not be
repeated here. 227 Typically, this literature suggests that the image of the
terrorist draws its rhetorical inspiration solely from the demonization of
prior wartime enemies. As Richard Jackson put it:
At its most basic level, the discursive construction of the depersonalized and
dehumanized ‘enemy other’ can be seen in the commonly used derogatory terms that
soldiers of every generation have employed. ‘Hun’, ‘Japs’, ‘gooks’, ‘rag-heads’ and
‘skinnies’ are the means by which fellow human beings—who are also husbands,
sons, brothers, friends—are discursively transformed into a hateful and loathsome
‘other’ who can be killed and abused without remorse or regret. The term ‘terrorist’ is

222
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE ET AL., FINAL REPORT: GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE ii
(2010).
223
147 CONG. REC. 17,457 (Sept. 20, 2001).
224
President George Bush, Remarks to the U.S. Attorneys Conference (Nov. 29, 2001),
(transcript
available
at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2001/11/20011129-12.html).
225
Id.
226
President George Bush, Address to the Nation (Sep. 11, 2001) (transcript available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html).
227
See, e.g., Gabe Mythen & Sandra Walklate, Criminology and Terrorism, 46 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 379 (2006); Timothy Recuber, The Terrorist as Folk Devil and Mass
Commodity: Moral Panics, Risk, and Consumer Culture, 2009 J. INST. INT’L STUD. 158
(2009).

2011]

DEVIANCE, RISK, AND LAW

769

simply the latest manifestation of this discursive process—today’s ‘terrorists’ are the
228
new ‘gooks.’

But this analogy is doubly flawed: on the one hand, it ignores virtually
all changes in American thought since the early 1970s, and on the other
hand, it suggests that wartime demonization is sui generis, and entirely
unrelated to the vilification of others that has marred so much of American
history. In these respects, the analogy is not so much mistaken as it is
incomplete. The latter of these flaws—the failure to recognize the
connection between wartime and peacetime demonization—is beyond the
scope of this Article. 229 My concern is with the former—the failure to take
account of recent changes in American thought.
The 9/11 attackers were non-state actors who committed an enormous
crime, and despite the great rhetorical effort to construct them as warriors—
despite, for instance, the attempt to denominate their conduct as an act of
war—the fact is that the terrorist does not easily fit into the public image of
an enemy soldier. Quite simply, it takes a creative imagination to see al
Qaeda as the same as the German, Japanese, Korean, or North Vietnamese
armies. What does it mean, therefore, to say, as Jackson does, that terrorists
are “the new” “gooks” or “Japs” or “Huns”? Americans cannot readily
identify Islamic terrorists with Japanese or German soldiers, and for good
reason—they are not remotely the same. Nor does the “War on Terror” fit
the popular understanding of war, as many have noted. These differences
are not inconsequential. On the contrary, they are at the heart of the
confusion in American post-9/11 policy—whether and to what extent “war”
is a useful or even intelligible paradigm for the challenge of trans-national
terrorism perpetrated by Islamic terrorists. While policymakers spar over
this question, Americans make sense of the Islamic terrorist by analogy to
what he has been rhetorically constructed to be—viz., not some modern
day enemy soldier, but as the latest, and by far the most dangerous iteration
of a lurking, apocalyptic danger posed by a subhuman predator that
threatens to overwhelm the American public, and for which the American
public demands the prompt elimination of all risk.
B. TERROR, RISK, AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION

Thus, the image of the terrorist was built from the same rhetorical
resources that had previously been used to build the monster-criminal. The
new beast, even more than his predecessors, was imagined to create a risk
of indescribable danger, and therefore demanded an even more
228

RICHARD JACKSON, WRITING THE WAR ON TERRORISM: LANGUAGE, POLITICS,
COUNTER-TERRORISM 60 (2005).
229
The topic is discussed in Margulies & Metcalf, supra note 5, at 435–37.
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comprehensive response—a response even more likely to eliminate all risk.
In that way, the cultural aversion to risk that dominates criminal justice
policy has also come to dominate the debate over preventive detention. 230
The rhetoric reveals the same explosive, populist insistence that all risk be
eliminated and all danger prevented. Yet in key respects, the preventive
detention debate is even more irrational, more hyperbolic, since partisans
can invoke more than a merely metaphoric war on crime. The cultural
hostility to risk, already elevated in the new penology, is amplified still
more by the notion that the country is at war, and that this beast is truly the
worst of the worst. It is in this explosive context that policymakers have
been debating preventive detention.
Though academics and journalists had been debating the merits of a
post-9/11 preventive detention regime for years, the idea received its most
prominent endorsement in May 2009 when President Obama, in his only
major speech on national security, included it as an option for the road
ahead. 231 Speaking at the National Archives, and invoking the mythical
power of the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of
Rights, Obama said the Bush Administration “went off course” when it
made “a series of hasty decisions” that “established an ad hoc legal
approach for fighting terrorism . . . that failed to rely on our legal traditions
and time-tested institutions, and that failed to use our values as a
compass.” 232 To correct these mistakes, Obama said he had made
“dramatic changes” that represented “a new direction from the last eight
years,” and that his approach to terrorism, unlike that of his predecessor,
was faithful to “our most fundamental values. . . [to] liberty and justice in
this country, and a light that shines for all who seek freedom, fairness,
equality, and dignity around the world.” 233 These changes, he vowed,
would allow us to resume our timeless “American journey . . . ‘to form a
more perfect union.’” 234

230

For an excellent account of risk management in the context of Israeli counterterrorism
policies, including the use of preventive detention, see Mimi Azjenstadt & Barak Ariel,
Terrorism and Risk Management: The Israeli Case, 10 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 355 (2008).
For a criticism of risk management approaches in British counterterrorism, see John Lea,
Terrorism, Crime, and the Collapse of Civil Liberties, Paper presented at the Criminology
Society,
Middlesex
University
(April
2005),
available
at
http://www.bunker8.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/misc/terror.htm.
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See President Barack Obama, Remarks on National Security at the National Archives
(May 21, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/ [hereinafter Remarks of the
President].
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Obama’s speech left a powerful impression that his Administration had
reclaimed America’s moral standing, ending the abuses of a shameful past
and returning to our foundational principles. 235 Lost in the comforting
rhetoric, however, were the policy details, which included—for the first
time in U.S. history—support for a preventive detention regime. In
outlining how his administration would deal with the prisoners at
Guantanamo, Obama divided them into five categories: those who would be
prosecuted in federal court, those who would be prosecuted before military
commissions, those who would be released to their home countries, those
who would be repatriated to another country, and those who would be
preventively detained.236 With respect to the fifth category, he said:
Now, finally, there remains the question of detainees at Guantanamo who cannot be
prosecuted yet who pose a clear danger to the American people. And I have to be
honest here—this is the toughest single issue that we will face. We’re going to
exhaust every avenue that we have to prosecute those at Guantanamo who pose a
danger to our country. But even when this process is complete, there may be a
number of people who cannot be prosecuted for past crimes, in some cases because
evidence may be tainted, but who nonetheless pose a threat to the security of the
United States. . . . Let me repeat: I am not going to release individuals who endanger
237
the American people.

In that way, the idea that depriving a person of his liberty—perhaps for
the rest of his life—not because of what he may have done, but because of
what he may yet do, and simply to avoid the risk of an adverse outcome at
trial, was smothered in the reassuring twaddle about American “values.”
This cultural aversion to risk resurfaced late in 2009, when Attorney
General Holder announced that the alleged 9/11 conspirators held at
Guantanamo would be prosecuted in federal court. The announcement
touched off an intense backlash on the political right that was awash in the
tropes of war and risk. The Wall Street Journal said Holder “has invited
grave and needless security risks by tempting jihadists the world over to
strike Manhattan while the trial is in session.”238 Charles Krauthammer
235

For an analysis of this speech as symbolic political rhetoric, see Margulies & Metcalf,
supra note 5, at 467–68.
236
Remarks of the President, supra note 231. Since Obama’s speech, and as of the end
of 2010, one Guantanamo prisoner has been prosecuted in federal court (Ahmed Ghailani,
whose case is discussed infra at notes 248–268); three have been prosecuted before military
commissions (Omar Khadr, Bilal al Qosi, and Noor Uthman Muhamad, all of whom pleaded
guilty and will be released in a few years). Since Guantanamo opened, approximately 600
prisoners have been released or repatriated. The remainder—approximately 170—remain at
Guantanamo. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 222, at 5–6; see also Carol J. Williams, The
Guantanamo Puzzle; The Case of a Former Soldier Raises More Questions About the
Prison’s Future, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at A9.
237
Remarks of the President, supra note 231.
238
Editorial, KSM Hits Manhattan—Again, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2009, at A14.
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said the “trial will be a security nightmare and a terror threat to New
York—what better propaganda-by-deed than blowing up the entire
courtroom, making [Khalid Sheik Mohammed] a martyr and making the
Republican
judge, jury and spectators into fresh victims?” 239
Representative Peter King of New York attacked the decision as “not only
misguided but extremely dangerous,” 240 and Representative Lamar Smith of
Texas, the highest ranking Republican on the House Judiciary Committee,
accused the administration of placing “the rights of terrorists over the rights
of Americans to be safe and secure.” 241
Human Events thought an attack on the trial itself was unlikely.
“Smart terrorists—and it is critically important that we realize the degree of
sophistication and cunning many of these men possess—are not going to
attack the trial or prison in order to break the defendants out.” Instead, they
will target
schools, hospitals, and churches that they will take down and hold hostage for release
of their compatriots. . . . If you live in a town where school children are held hostage,
raped and murdered, perhaps in Westchester Country, New Jersey, or Long Island, or
another more remote location, ask yourself, are you . . . personally willing to accept
242
the risk?

Many commentators also dwelt on the prospect that “one or more of these
detainees could be acquitted, which would be a mockery of justice.” 243
“The possibility that Khalid Sheik Mohammed and his co-conspirators
could be found ‘not guilty’ due to some legal technicality just blocks from
Ground Zero should give every American pause,” House Republican leader
John Boehner said. 244
Responding to this criticism, Holder adopted the unfortunate position
of all but guaranteeing that the prisoners prosecuted in federal court would
be duly convicted. “I would not have authorized the prosecution of these
cases,” he said, “unless I was confident that our outcome would be a
successful one.” 245 Whatever else the rule of law might imply, it certainly
means the state ought not to be able to guarantee a particular outcome in
advance. Observers quickly seized on his language. Charles Krauthammer,
239

Charles Krauthammer, New York Travesty, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 2009, at C14.
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for instance, mused, “Doesn’t the presumption of innocence, er, presume
that prosecutorial failure—acquittal, hung jury—is an option?
By
undermining that presumption, Holder is undermining the fairness of the
trial, the demonstration of which is the alleged rationale for putting on this
show in the first place.” 246 This criticism was misdirected; every trial
lawyer makes assessments about the probable outcome of an upcoming
trial, and prosecutors often assess their likelihood of success as quite high.
What is significant in Holder’s remark was not that he predicted success,
but that all participants in the conversation shared the view that an acquittal
would have completely de-legitimized the process. The entire debate, in
other words, assumed an unwillingness to countenance the risk of an
adverse outcome. No result could satisfy the punitive turn in American life
unless the risk to society was zero. 247
All of this heated rhetoric about risk converged in the furor
surrounding the outcome of the Ahmed Ghailani trial. A federal grand jury
in the Southern District of New York had indicted Ghailani for his alleged
role in the 1998 al Qaeda bombings of the United States embassies in
Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.248 The simultaneous
explosions killed nearly three hundred people, including more than two
hundred innocent civilians. 249 After five days of deliberations, the jury
acquitted Ghailani of all counts but one, convicting him of a single count of
conspiracy to destroy government buildings and property. 250
Four of Ghailani’s co-conspirators had been captured shortly after the
bombing. They had been brought to New York by the FBI, where they
were prosecuted in the Southern District, convicted, and sentenced to life in
prison. 251 Ghailani, by contrast, was arrested July 24, 2004 in Pakistan. 252
Rather than bring him to the United States to face prosecution, he was
246

Krauthammer, supra note 239; see also Robert Stein, The Trouble with the 9/11 Trial,
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Nov. 17, 2010, at A1.
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Ghailani was acquitted of four other counts of conspiracy, including conspiring to kill
Americans and to use weapons of mass destruction. Id.
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detained and interrogated by the CIA at undisclosed “black sites” as part of
the Bush Administration’s “enhanced interrogation program.”
In
September 2006, the CIA relinquished custody of him and thirteen other socalled high value detainees to the Department of Defense, which held them
at Guantanamo. 253 Ghailani was the first (and so far, the only) CIA and
Guantanamo detainee to be tried in civilian court.254 Further complicating
the issue was Judge Lewis Kaplan’s pretrial ruling that an important
prosecution witness could not testify because the Government had learned
the man’s identity through Ghailani’s concededly involuntary statements
made during admittedly abusive interrogations.255
The Ghailani verdict was immediately denounced in terms that
resonate perfectly with the punitive turn. Conservatives attacked the
Obama Administration for its reckless decision to expose the country to the
risk of an adverse outcome. Republican Senator Mitch McConnell said he,
“like most Americans, wondered why we would even take the chance” of
trying Ghailani in a civilian court.256 Liz Cheney, the daughter of the
former Vice President and member of the advocacy group, KEEP
AMERICA SAFE, considered it inexcusable to be “roll[ing] the dice in a
time of war.” 257 And Jennifer Rubin, writing in Commentary Magazine,
called the entire trial “part of a stunt by the Obama administration.”258
Other commentators focused on the failure of the verdict to send an
unambiguous signal of the community’s outrage, as though only a verdict in
favor of the government on every count could possibly satisfy the bloodlust of the American people. Peter King, for instance, the incoming
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Chairman of the House Homeland Security Subcommittee, called the
verdict, for which Ghailani will be sentenced to a minimum of twenty years
and a maximum of life imprisonment, “a total miscarriage of justice.”259
Cheney said it sent a dangerous signal of “weakness in a time of war.” 260
To be sure, some writers quite properly pointed out that the function of
a trial is “to guarantee fairness, not convictions.” 261 Writing in the New
Yorker, for instance, Amy Davidson said, “[o]ur legal system is not a
machine for producing the maximum number of convictions, regardless of
the law.” 262 Others ventured that we had only ourselves to blame for the
Ghailani verdict. Focusing on the impact of Judge Kaplan’s pretrial ruling,
the Center for Constitutional Rights said, “If anyone is unsatisfied with
Ghailani’s acquittal on 284 counts, they should blame the CIA agents who
tortured him.” 263 And some criticized the previous administration for
mishandling the case at an earlier stage.264 But these voices were largely
drowned out by a chorus of condemnation, an angry indignation that
Obama had “rolled the dice,” 265 and that Ghailani would not get his just
desserts.
More importantly, however, is the outcome that dared not speak its
name: that Ghailani could have been given a fair trial, and if acquitted,
released and repatriated. The very prospect left conservatives quaking with
rage and liberals shaking in fear. Even Judge Kaplan, in his order granting
the defense motion in limine to prevent the testimony of the key
prosecution witness, reassured himself and the public that, if Ghailani were
259
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to be acquitted as a result of his ruling, he could still be held as an enemy
combatant at Guantanamo. 266 The prospect that the United States would
have to endure the risk that even a single alleged terrorist would be released
proved too much for American culture to contemplate.267
And in this climate, calls for preventive detention have predictably
resurfaced. Why take any risk? Why expose the country’s legal system to
the calumny it endured after the Ghailani verdict? Why incur the cost and
effort? Far better that Ghailani and others at Guantanamo simply be
detained, without regard to what they may have done, or what the
government can prove they have done, in the past. So argue Jack
Goldsmith and Ben Wittes, longtime champions of preventive detention,
who declare that in light of the verdict, preventive detention “now makes
more sense than trial in any forum for a dwindling group of Guantanamo
detainees whose prosecutions are more trouble and risk than they’re
worth.” 268
In this risk-averse spirit, Congress, in the waning days of 2010,
effectively eliminated the President’s ability to transfer Guantanamo
prisoners to the custody of another country or bring them to the United
States for any purpose, including prosecution. 269 This legislation, which
expires in a year, is awash in the rhetoric of the new penology, but is
especially noteworthy for its novel insistence that the rest of the world
assume the same posture. To begin with, Congress specified that no
Department of Defense funds may be used to transfer any prisoner to
another country unless the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that
the receiving state “is not a designated state sponsor of terrorism or a
266
United States v. Ghailani, No. S10 98 Crim. 1023, 2010 WL 4006381, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010).
267
Concurring in a recent per curiam decision that denied habeas relief to a Guantanamo
prisoner, Judge Lawrence Silberman of the D.C. Circuit elaborated on what he perceived as
the difference between the run of the mine criminal case and a case involving a Guantanamo
detainee:

In the typical criminal case, a good judge will vote to overturn a conviction if the prosecutor
lacked sufficient evidence, even when the judge is virtually certain that the defendant committed
the crime. That can mean that a thoroughly bad person is released onto our streets, but I need not
explain why our criminal justice system treats that risk as one we all believe, or should believe,
is justified. When we are dealing with detainees, candor obliges me to admit that one cannot
help but be conscious of the infinitely greater downside risk to our country, and its people, of an
order releasing a detainee who is likely to return to terrorism.

Esmail v. Obama, No. 10-5282, 2011 WL 1327701, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Apr.. 8, 2011)
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designated foreign terrorist organization,” maintains “effective control”
over any facility in which the prisoner might be detained, and is not “facing
a threat that is likely to substantially affect its ability to exercise control
over the individual.” 270
But these conditions, all of which bear on whether the receiving state
can securely imprison the monsters at Guantanamo, do not exhaust the
requirements imposed by Congress. Before a transfer may take place, the
receiving state must agree “to take effective steps to ensure that the
individual cannot take action to threaten the United States, its citizens, or its
allies in the future,” must show that it has already taken steps “to ensure
that the individual cannot engage or re-engage in any terrorist activity,” and
must agree “to share any information with the United States that (A) is
related to the individual or any associates of the individual; and (B) could
affect the security of the United States, its citizens, or its allies.” 271 And
even if all these conditions have been met, no transfer is allowed if any
prisoner who was previously transferred to the receiving state
“subsequently engaged in any terrorist activity.” 272 In short, the receiving
state must guarantee, in advance, that the person to be transferred will never
pose any risk to “the security of the United States, its citizens, or its
allies.” 273 No such guarantee is possible, of course, unless the person
remains at Guantanamo—which is precisely the purpose of the legislation.
And even if the guarantee is made, it counts for naught if any prisoner
previously released to the state engaged in any “terrorist activity.” 274
Congress apparently assumes no other country can be sufficiently
punitive to satisfy the security interests of the United States. As dangerous
as this assumption may be, it is even more astounding that Congress should
make the same assumption about security conditions within the United
States. And yet it apparently did. In the same legislation, Congress
prohibited the use of Defense Department funds to bring a prisoner at
Guantanamo to the United States for any reason, including prosecution.275
Congress also barred the use of funds to modify any mainland site for
Guantanamo prisoners, which nixes the Obama Administration’s plan to
reconfigure the unused prison at Thomson, Illinois.276 In addition,
Congress demanded that the Secretary of Defense, by April 1, 2011, report
to Congress “on the merits, costs, and risks of using any proposed facility in
270
271
272
273
274
275
276

Id. at 530.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 531.
Id. at 530.
Id.
Id. at 531.
Id. at 532.
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the United States, its territories, or possessions” to house Guantanamo
prisoners. 277 The report must include, inter alia, a “discussion of any
potential risks to any community in the vicinity of any such proposed
facility, the measures that could be taken to mitigate such risks, and the
likely cost to the Department of Defense of implementing such measures,”
as well as “modifications” that may be necessary “to ensure that any
detainee transferred from Guantanamo Bay to such facility could not come
into contact with any other individual, including any other person detained
at such facility, that is not approved for such contact by the Department of
Defense.” 278
Shortly after the legislation passed, the media reported that President
Obama was considering a new executive order that would create a periodic
review process for the four-dozen Guantanamo prisoners who cannot be
tried but who are thought by the Administration to be too dangerous to
release. 279 It was not clear from these reports, however, whether the
President would claim the power to hold people based solely on predictions
of future dangerousness—that is, whether he would create a preventive
detention regime as I have described it—or whether detentions at
Guantanamo would continue to be based on proof of past wrongdoing. In
response to these reports, the Washington Post assumed he intended a
preventive detention regime, cheered that it was a step in the right direction,
but asked “[w]hat about the next 48?” 280 Pointing out that the United States
now seems to be operating against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Waziristan,
an area outside any recognized war zone, the Post wondered what would
happen in the “likely” event that the government captures new suspects who
cannot be tried “because of a lack of admissible evidence . . . . Would the
administration simply let the captives go, even though intelligence reports
indicate that they pose a threat?” 281
The prospect was literally
inconceivable to the Post, which favors a statute that would allow such
suspects to be detained indefinitely based on nothing more than the “threat”
of future harm. 282 It bears noting that under the current state of the law,
277

Id. at 533.
Id. at 534.
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See, e.g., Peter Finn & Anne E. Kornblut, White House May Challenge Bill’s
Guantanamo
Provisions,
WASH.
POST,
Jan.
4,
2011,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/03/
AR2011010305636.html (“The administration is also planning to issue an executive order
that would formalize indefinite detention without trial for some detainees at the U.S. military
prison, but allow those detainees and their lawyers to continue to challenge the basis for
continued incarceration on a regular basis.”).
280
Editorial, The New Detainee Dilemma, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2010, at A26.
281
Id.
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The Post editorial was particularly muddled. For one thing, it wrongly asserted that
the new legislation would bar the Administration from prosecuting newly arrested suspects
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such a suspect would not have a right to challenge his detention in habeas
unless he were a United States citizen or, if a foreign national, he were
brought to the United States or Guantanamo. 283
On March 7, 2011, President Obama issued his much-anticipated
executive order. 284 Dodging a bullet, this order did not establish a
preventive detention regime as I have used the term. Instead, it directed the
creation of a regular review process for those prisoners who the
Administration believes may be subject to indefinite detention, including
those who cannot be prosecuted. Those prisoners, however, may still seek a
writ of habeas corpus to challenge the lawfulness of their detention.285
Such a challenge obligates the government to establish the legal and factual
basis for continued detention, which requires proof about the past rather
than predictions about the future. And notably, nothing in the order
empowers the United States to detain people who have prevailed in habeas.
The Order, therefore, does not alter or enlarge the existing bases upon
which the United States may detain prisoners. That is, it did not purport to
allow detention based solely on predictions of future dangerousness.
VI. CONCLUSION
And so captures the current state of play. Otherwise responsible
observers call for a statute that would allow the United States to detain
suspects captured anywhere in the world, for as long as the “War on Terror”
may last, without regard to what they may have done in the past, and based
on no other proof than classified “intelligence reports” that they “pose a

in federal court. Id. In fact, however, the legislation only applies to prisoners at
Guantanamo; nothing in the law would prevent the Administration from bringing a newly
arrested suspect to the United States for trial. At least, not yet. In addition, and more
importantly, the Post argued that preventive detention would be acceptable if it were
authorized by statute but that in the absence of a statute it would violate the rule of law. Id.
To the Post, in other words, the rule of law is whatever Congress says it is. This is a
singularly mechanical view and would no doubt come as a surprise to students of history
who had always imagined that, for instance, the Alien and Sedition Acts from the close of
the eighteenth century, the Espionage and Sedition Acts enacted during the First World War,
and the law which criminalized resistance to the internment of the Japanese during the
Second World War had been noteworthy derogations from the rule of law.
283
Compare Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 679 (2008) (finding that U.S. citizens
detained by the United States may invoke the habeas statute to challenge their detention,
regardless of where they are held), with Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (holding that federal courts have no jurisdiction to entertain a challenge to detention of
a foreign national held by the United States at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan).
284
Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7, 2007) (Periodic Review of
Individuals Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to the Authorization for the
Use of Military Force).
285
Id. § 1(a)–(b).
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threat.” By merging the overheated rhetoric of “war” with the new
penology’s understanding of deviance and risk, American society has set
itself on a quest for the Holy Grail—a risk management solution to terror, a
solution which demands nothing of us and imposes all burdens on them.
And this, we suppose, will help us win the war.
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